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ABSTRACT 
    The master agreements that nominally govern the transactions 
between mid-western Original Equipment Manufacturers and their 
suppliers are not, for the most part, designed to create legal obliga-
tions. Rather, they create a space in which private order can flour-
ish, much like the role played by firm boundaries in the Coase-
Williamson theory of the firm. This Article explores how sophisti-
cated transactors in this market have combined governance tech-
niques associated with arm’s-length contracting, intra-firm hierar-
chy, and trust-based relational contracting to create relationships 
that are long-term, highly cooperative, and characterized by signifi-
cant relationship-specific investment. It suggests that these transac-
tors have been able to accomplish these outcomes with only mini-
mal reliance on the legal system, in large part because they operate 
in a market of highly interconnected firms—a network that itself 
functions as a contract governance mechanism. It then explores the 
implications of these contract structures and the availability of 
network governance for firms’ make-or-buy decisions and the like-
lihood of innovation. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Large mid-western original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) have de-
vised contractual structures to govern their relationships with their suppliers 
that, while nominally contractual in the traditional sense, are better understood 
as private order institutions. Like diamond merchants,1 cotton merchants,2 and 
grain merchants,3 who have largely opted out of the public legal system by creat-
ing trade-association-run private legal systems to resolve disputes and support 
trade among their members, these buyers have structured their supplier rela-
tionships in ways that make the legal system largely irrelevant to their contract-
ing relationships.4 Although the contracts used to consummate these transac-
tions are long and detailed, they are not designed to create incentives for per-
formance and breach primarily through the prospect of court-imposed monetary 																																																								
1 Bernstein (1992) (discussing private ordering in New York’s 47th Street diamond markets).   
2 Bernstein (2001) (describing private ordering in the cash cotton markets). 
3 Bernstein (1996) (describing private ordering in the grain and feed business).  
4 Contracts, however, remain important to establishing and protecting intellectual property 
rights and ownership of physical assets (like tooling).  
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damages. Rather, they are designed to keep the law—in the sense of legal en-
forcement of contractual obligations—largely out of their relationship with their 
suppliers. As one OEM explained, “We have a Master Supply Agreement [with 
our suppliers, yet it] is not a contract to buy. It is an agreement as to how we are 
going to do business.”5 
Conceptually, the Master Supply Agreements (“MSAs”) that formally govern 
these transactions play a role in supply relationships that is similar to the role 
that is played by firm boundaries in the Coase-Williamson theory of the firm: 
they clear a space for other, extralegal modes of contract governance to work.6  
This Article explores the ways that the sophisticated transactors in these mar-
kets have combined the governance techniques associated with arm’s-length 
contracting, intra-firm hierarchy, and trust-based relational contracting to create 
relationships that are long-term, highly cooperative, and involve adequate levels 
of specific investment. It suggests that these transactors have been able to ac-
complish these outcomes with only minimal reliance on the legal system, in 
large part because they operate in a market of highly interconnected firms—a 
network that itself functions as a contract governance mechanism. When net-
work governance is available, it makes other contract administration mecha-
nisms more powerful and broadens the self-enforcing range of contractual obli-
gations. It also expands the types of behavior that can be sanctioned through 
reputational harm or rewarded through reputational or other nonlegal bene-
fits—extending it to include behavior that could not be sanctioned or rewarded 
through contract. As a consequence of these and other effects, the availability of 
network governance enables transactors to credibly commit to obligations that, 
in the absence of the network, could not be adequately bonded through either 
legally enforceable arms-length agreements or long-term relational contracts. 
More broadly, the Article suggests that a firm’s make-or-buy decisions may be 
influenced by whether the firm and its putative suppliers are part of a highly in-
terconnected network of firms. When network governance is available and 																																																								
5 Unless otherwise explicitly noted, quotes from Mid-Western OEMs and their suppliers were 
taken from hundreds of pages of interview transcripts conducted by Josh Whitford and his col-
laborators that are described in Whitford (2006, Appendix A1). Due to restrictions placed on the 
original study by an institutional review board, identifying details about the interviewees have 
been replaced by general descriptions of the firm’s type along with the designation “NOE Re-
spondent.”  
6 A similar argument has been made about the function of the legal doctrines of employment at 
will, see Epstein (1984), and the business judgment rule. See Rock & Wachter (2001). 
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transactors are also able to avail themselves of contract administration mecha-
nisms that recreate many of the governance benefits of intra-firm hierarchy, the 
functional domain of “buy” may be far broader than it is assumed to be in the 
classic Coase-Williamson theory of the firm. This expanded domain of buy to-
gether with the recognition that the local network around a supplier (that is, the 
firms it buys from and sells to directly) may influence the likelihood that it will 
be able to innovate on the buyer’s behalf, suggests that OEMs’ make-or-buy de-
cisions may be driven not only by transactions costs as traditionally defined, but 
also by the network structure of the relevant market, the network position of 
available suppliers, and the OEM’s need for innovation.  
In sum, understanding the ways these agreements are governed suggests that 
their goal is not merely to secure performance of the promises they contain. Ra-
ther, and perhaps more importantly, these agreements are artfully designed to 
create a framework for growing relational social capital and leveraging network 
governance—a framework that is likely to succeed in creating the conditions that 
will better enable transactors to identify and bond value-creating exchanges in 
the future. Given this, modern commercial lawyers who want to draft contracts 
that will promote the creation of the greatest value for their clients over time, 
must take into account the network structure of the market in which their clients 
operate, as well as buyer and supplier’s past relationship and position in that 
network, in order to achieve this goal.7  																																																								
7 More specifically, lawyers will need to develop different contractual structures for deals 
where their clients are transacting in the network-free context depicted on the left of the figure 
below and deals that take place in the type of deeply embedded network context depicted on the 
right. 
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the MSAs used in OEM-supplier 
relationships. It discusses the contractual and practical limits on the monetary 
damages they make available and describes the interior remedies created by 
buyers to increase the likelihood that suppliers will perform as promised. It also 
explores a variety of ways that these agreements effectively recreate the govern-
ance methods commonly associated with intra-firm hierarchy within these con-
tractual relationships.  
Part II looks at the contract administration mechanisms that, together with 
certain terms in the master agreements and attention to network position, create 
the conditions that enable cooperative contracting relationships for producing 
goods to a buyer’s specifications to arise and endure.  
Part III draws on interview evidence from a study of OEM-supplier relation-
ships in the upper mid-west, as well as empirical studies of procurement con-
tracts and strategic alliances, to explore how make-to-spec contracts evolve into 
highly relational contracts. It suggests that as transactors successfully work 
through the inevitable bumps in their initial contracts, they begin to exchange 
information and to develop the type of relationship-specific social capital that 
gives rise to both interpersonal and inter-organizational trust. Over time, as a 
consequence of these interactions, transactors become better able to both identify 
additional value-creating deals and partially bond more complex undertakings 
(like the co-development of new products) for which it is much harder, if not 
impossible, to write a contract with objective metrics for determining breach or 
performance.   
Part IV introduces the concept of network governance. It explores the ways 
that the network position of both the buyer and supplier (sometimes referred to 
as “structural social capital”8) can be understood as a distinct contract govern-
																																																																																																																																																																					
 
 
8 This Article uses the term “structural social capital” to refer to the advantage that accrues to a 
firm or person from their position in a network with a particular structure. It uses the term “rela-
tional social capital” to refer to the relationship-specific trust and understanding that emerges be-
tween two individuals or two firms. In the sociology literature, “structural social capital” is some-
times referred to simply as “social capital,” see Burt, Kilduff & Tasselli (2013, 529) (“Network 
forms associated with advantage constitute social capital”), or as “structural embeddedness.” In 
that literature “relational social capital” is also referred to as “relational embeddedness.” See Mo-
ran (2005) (describing the genesis and definition of these terms). Other authors refer to social capi-
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ance mechanism—one that can substitute for contract provisions or complement 
and strengthen them—and discusses in more depth the ways that the availability 
of network governance may affect contractual relationships and the types of 
credible commitments transactors can make. It discusses the way that some 
firms have sought not only to leverage the force of network governance, but also 
to actively create it by encouraging the formation of smaller local networks (such 
as relational ties among their suppliers) to bond obligations that cannot be ade-
quately bonded through the law, the forces of repeat dealing, or network gov-
ernance writ large.  
Part V is more speculative. Drawing on foundational insights from network 
analysis, it discusses the ways that a supplier’s local network might influence the 
likelihood that it will be able to innovate in coordination with, or on behalf of, a 
buyer. It then suggests that the need for quicker and more frequent innovation 
may be a reason that these OEMs have shifted from vertical integration to out-
sourcing, despite the costs of governing these highly relational contracts, a cost 
that markedly increases when supplier-led innovation is expected. 
Part VI concludes. It suggests that an appreciation of the ways that contract 
provisions and other contract governance mechanisms interact with social capi-
tal and network position, together with a clearer understanding of the true costs 
and benefits of relational contracting, will enable firms to make more informed 
make-or-buy decisions. In addition, it will enable commercial lawyers to con-
struct more effective contract governance mechanisms when firms do decide to 
outsource production. 
I. THE WEAK SHADOW OF THE LAW 
Outsourcing relationships between large mid-western OEMs like John Deere 
and parts suppliers are typically governed by MSAs. These lengthy agreements 
cover many of the core legal aspects of a supply contract—such as limitations on 
liability, warranty, confidentiality, modification, ownership of tooling and ma-
chines,9 insurance, cure, and intellectual property. However, neither the OEMs 																																																																																																																																																																					
tal as having relational, structural, and sometimes cognitive dimensions. See Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
(1998). 
9 Many MSAs allocate ownership of specialized machines used in the supplier’s plants to the 
buyer. Buyers are given the right to inspect the machines and suppliers are required to clearly 
mark the machines as the buyer’s property, insure them, and provide buyers with periodic 
maintenance reports. These agreements are an important feature of these deals; they may miti-
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nor their suppliers view these agreements as creating a set of obligations to be 
enforced in court. Rather, they view them as creating a framework for a contract-
ing relationship. As Harley Davidson’s MSA itself explains, “Th[is] MSA. . . de-
scribes in general terms how we work together with our suppliers. . . .[It} is not a 
long-term commitment; rather it is a commitment about how we will operate in 
the long-term”10. And, as one supplier explained, reflecting a similar conception 
of the role of contract, “the contract is just a formalized handshake that says that 
your intention is to put business in here.”11   
1. MSAs and Traditional Legal Remedies 
Many MSAs used in the largest deals are structured as long-term agreements 
with fixed or variable quantity provisions. In most small or medium sized deals, 
however, the MSAs omit a quantity provision.12 They are therefore legally unen-
forceable until a purchase order specifying a quantity is sent and accepted.13 
When this structure is used, the transactors contemplate a long-term relation-
ship, but divide it into a series of smaller transactions that the supplier under-
stands will continue as long as its performance and pricing are competitive. In 
practice, however, these transactional structures are quite similar. Long-term 
MSAs often give buyers the right to terminate for “convenience” so long as the 
supplier is reimbursed for its reliance expenses.14 Many also have “competition-
																																																																																																																																																																					
gate (though not eliminate) the potential for the types of hold-up problems identified by theorists 
of the firm. They also may reduce the risks faced by a buyer in the event of a supplier’s bankrupt-
cy. See Baird & Casey (2013, 39–42). 
10 Harley-Davidson, Doing Business with Harley-Davidson (2015, “Master Supply Agreement” 
module). The Harley contract is structured as a series of “modules,” each dealing with a different 
aspect of the relationship. 
11 NOE Respondent. 
12 Some MSAs state very clearly that they involve no commitment on the part of the buyer to 
purchase anything. See, e.g., Master Supply Agreement between Sun Microsystems Inc. and Mitac In-
ternational Corporation (2007, Sec. 3.1) (“[N]either this Agreement nor any Award Letter or Blanket 
Purchase Order will constitute a commitment to purchase any particular quantity of Products. 
Sun shall only be committed to purchase Products . . . when Sun has tendered a purchase order to 
Supplier in accordance with an Award Letter.“).  
13 Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the statute that governs transactions in 
the sale of goods, a contract must have a quantity provision to be legally enforceable. U.C.C. § 2–
201 (1977). 
14  See, e.g., Deere, Terms and Conditions, 
https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/wcm/connect/71fad4004d1bd535930dbba912093b63/purchasing_t
erms_and_conditions_can_eng.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. (“Buyer may terminate this Order for its 
convenience, in whole or in part . . . at any time. If this Order is terminated for convenience, any 
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out” clauses. These clauses provide that if “a particular part . . . is not a competi-
tive value [for the buyer] in price, performance, delivery, reliability, quality and 
technology with other equivalent parts of equivalent value, usage, or availability 
in the world,” the supplier has 90 days to submit an “action plan and time 
frame” to meet the price and other product attributes.15 If he cannot or will not 
meet the competition, the buyer has the right to terminate the contract and buy 
the part from another supplier. As a consequence of these provisions, the con-
tinuation of even long-term agreements depends on the buyer’s satisfaction with 
the supplier’s performance, not merely on whether the supplier technically ful-
fills its contractual obligations. As one supplier explained, “you get these MSAs 
with 28 pages and 34 addendums, but in reality their value boils down to their 
termination and meet the competition clauses.”16 
Most MSAs are supplemented by additional sources of written obligations. 
Statements of Work or Service Level Agreements that are negotiated by manag-
ers (not lawyers) provide detailed technical specifications, information about the 
way conformity with product and delivery parameters will be assessed, and 
penalties for non-performance or sub-standard performance. Additional boiler-
plate terms are added by the purchase orders. And, perhaps most importantly, 
these agreements also explicitly incorporate the lengthy sets of terms contained 
in buyer-drafted Supplier Quality Manuals,17 Supplier Codes of Conduct (or Eth-
ics),18 and Environmental Handbooks. Among other things, these handbooks 																																																																																																																																																																					
claim of seller shall be settled on the basis of reasonable costs incurred by seller in the perfor-
mance of this Order.”). 
15 This clause is taken from an MSA between a large publicly traded supplier and an OEM 
(names withheld upon request). See also Long Term Supply Agreement between Deere and Stanadyne 
(Aug. 14, 2007) at Cl. VI (“Competition Clause”). Moreover, even when these clauses are not in-
cluded in the MSA, their terms are the de facto reality facing suppliers. As one supplier explained, 
even when a long-term contract of a specified duration was used, “most customers have come 
back in and violated those kind of agreements . . . [they] say, we know we negotiated this deal, 
however, business conditions have changed and we need your help, partner, to help us out of 
this situation . . . so, long-term contracts, they sound nice and are nice things to talk about, but we 
have found that there are problems in our customers adhering to those contracts.” NOE Re-
spondent. 
16 Interview with Manager at a Large Supplier (Dec. 2015). 
17 See, e.g., Deere & Company Supplier Quality Manual (JDS6223, rev. 2009-03-12, Sec. 4 “Quali-
ty Management System) (hereinafter “Deere QM”) (“[A]cceptance of a John Deere purchase order 
constitutes acceptance of the requirements of this manual”). 
18 Deere (2015) (setting out suppliers’ obligations with respect to “Child Labor . . . Forced La-
bor . . . Hiring and Employment Practices, ” including “compensation and working hours,” as 
well as environmental impact, and other matters).  
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contain detailed manufacturing process specifications, ethical sourcing require-
ments, environmental responsibility guidelines, and a description of the roles the 
buyer’s employees are entitled to play in the supplier’s production process. Any 
conflicts between the provisions of these writings are resolved by reference to 
the agreement’s stated hierarchy of authority.19  
MSAs vary in terms of their limitations on court-awarded monetary damages. 
Many limit damages to the contract price or some low multiple of it, or exclude 
recovery of lost profits as well as both incidental and consequential damages.20 
Others contain no such limitations. In practice, however, buyers are aware that 
for a variety of doctrinal and practical reasons, they would not be fully compen-
sated if they sued a supplier for breach of contract.21 
Under prevailing doctrines, buyers would have difficulty proving lost profits 
with the requisite certainty. They might also be wary of seeking them because 
doing so would require them to reveal their profit margins which might, in turn, 																																																								
19 See, e.g., Ingersoll Rand, Inc. Global Supplier Quality Manual (GPO-Q-SW-001 Rev. 1) (2014, 
Sec. 2.0) (“In the event of a conflict . . . the various components of the agreements shall be given 
the following precedence (in descending Order of precedence): . . . the Supply Agreement . . . a 
purchase order . . . an applicable country/region supplement to the buyer’s terms and conditions 
of purchase . . . the buyer’s terms and conditions of purchase and . . . the Global Supplier Quality 
Manual”). 
20 See, e.g., Supply Agreement between Dresser-Rand and Ingersoll-Rand (Oct. 31, 2004) at Cl. 10 
(limiting the recovery of these damages even if they were foreseeable); Manufacturing and Supply 
agreement between DSM Pharmaceuticals and AAI Pharma (Jan. 26, 2004) (excluding various types of 
damages and capping liability during the contract’s first year to five million dollars and the liabil-
ity thereafter to “TWO (2) TIMES THE AGGREGATE PURCHASE PRICE FOR PRODUCT SUP-
PLIED DURING THE LAST TWELVE (12) MONTHS OF THIS AGREEMENT”); Sun Microsys-
tems Agreement, supra note 12 (limiting liability for both torts and breaches of contract, “TO THE 
GREATER OF TWO MILLION US DOLLARS (US$2,000,000) OR TWO TIMES (2X) THE TOTAL 
FEES PAID BY SUN FOR THE PRODUCT OVER THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT.”); Interview 
with New York Outsourcing Lawyer (Nov. 2015) (noting that it was very common to cap damag-
es at some low multiple of the contract price in OEM-supplier contracts and that when such caps 
were not included, OEMs were generally aware that they would have trouble collecting full 
damages from small or medium-sized suppliers). 
21 Most of these agreements have separate provisions dealing with damages for breach of warran-
ty and “epidemic failure” of components. An “epidemic failure” is a failure of a component or 
assembly at a rate defined in the MSA, see, e.g., Sun Microsystems Agreement, supra note 12 at Sec. 
18.4.1, that greatly impairs the value of the buyer’s final product to his customers, typically caus-
ing health or safety-related harms that have a damaging effect on the buyer’s reputation. Most 
MSAs require the supplier to insure against such events and name the buyer as the beneficiary of 
the insurance policy. See, e.g., Deere and Stanadyne Agreement, supra note 15 at Sec. XIX “Insurance” 
(requiring Stanadyne to maintain certain types of product liability insurance for at least ten years 
following production of the product and noting that the policies must name Deere as a benefi-
ciary and be issued by a company meeting certain financial criteria).	
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damage their bargaining position in negotiations with other parts suppliers.22 It 
is also unlikely that courts would fully compensate buyers for the switching 
costs associated with qualifying a new supplier23 or the potential damage to their 
reputation resulting from use of a defective component that causes downstream 
product malfunction.  
Moreover, as a practical matter, the shadow cast by the right to receive money 
damages (even fully compensatory damages) is far less powerful in these types 
of long-term or repeat dealing exchanges than it is in discrete exchanges. In these 
types of relationships, it is not unusual for the filing of a lawsuit for breach of 
contract to be a relationship-ending event.24 As counsel to one OEM explained, 
“a supplier gets offended if you, the customer take him to court, it leads to bad 
blood, he is going to be pissed off at you during the litigation as he is incurring 
attorney’s fees and having his employees distracted, the distrust that litigation 
creates just makes continued dealing impossible.”25 
A buyer is therefore unlikely to sue for breach of contract (or have a credible 
threat to sue) unless the amount he can recover (net of litigation costs, switching 
costs, secrecy costs and reputation costs) exceeds the present value of the mar-
ginal benefit of continuing to deal with this supplier, rather than the next best 
supplier, in the future. Given that the size of each order tends to be small relative 
to the value of the long-term relationship, suppliers realize that buyers will rare-																																																								
22 See Bernstein & Ben-Shahar (2000) (exploring the ways that concern about information reve-
lation in discovery might affect a transactor’s incentive to sue). Counsel to a Large OEM con-
firmed that a desire to avoid revealing sensitive firm information during discovery in general, 
and e-discovery in particular, was one of the most important reasons her company avoided litiga-
tion. Interview with Counsel to a Large OEM (Dec. 2015). 
23 Some of these switching costs, such as search costs and the costs of putting multiple poten-
tial suppliers through their supplier qualification program until a suitable new partner is found, 
would be relatively easy to quantify. Other potentially significant costs would not. These include 
the increased coordination and monitoring costs associated with transacting with a new supplier 
as well as the costs arising from the time it takes the buyer’s personnel to establish the types of 
connections and understandings with the new supplier’s personnel that facilitate problem solv-
ing. Even more problematic from the perspective of a buyer is that in contexts where a buyer’s 
immediate reaction to a termination would be to temporarily increase his purchases from an ex-
isting supplier, a court would likely conclude that switching costs are negligible. However, these 
costs are, in practice, quite significant. Buyers limit their buy from any one supplier for good rea-
sons, see infra discussion accompanying notes 94-98, and at some point in the future would there-
fore still have to bear the costs of finding a new supplier.  
24 The effects of different types of lawsuits, like patent disputes, on the likelihood that parties 
will continue dealing is less clear.  
25 Interview with Counsel to Large Midwestern OEM (Dec. 2015). 
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ly have a credible threat to sue them in the event of a breach unless the buyer has 
concluded—perhaps because of a pattern of breaches over time, or the availabil-
ity of a better supplier—that it is worthwhile to end the relationship.26 
Recognizing the effects of lawsuits on the prospect of future dealing suggests 
that the shadow cast by the threat of court-imposed monetary sanctions on the 
work-a-day actions of suppliers would likely be weak, even in the absence of 
damages limitations. Over an important range of purchase order values, buyers 
only have a credible threat to sue for breach of a contracting relationship, rather 
than a mere breach of contract.   
Yet even when it is worthwhile to end a supply relationship, buyers prefer to 
simply terminate the supplier and bear the loss rather than file a lawsuit. As 
counsel to one OEM explained, as a buyer “you don’t want to get a reputation 
for suing your suppliers, it will make all of them jittery, we will then be viewed 
with distrust, others will negotiate for more protections, our world . . . is very 
small, word gets around.”27 And, as a strategic sourcing manager at a large OEM 
explained, “Contracts are not about lawsuits, they are about divorce. Sometimes 
we just want out, making termination provisions the most important part of the 
deal.”28  
Although buyers prefer termination to litigation, their termination decisions 
are also tempered by both reputational and practical concerns. Buyers fear that if 
they terminate suppliers too often or at the first sign of trouble, their existing 
suppliers will be more reluctant to make relationship-specific investments and 
putative suppliers will view them as less desirable contracting partners.29 Buyers 
are also concerned that terminating even underperforming suppliers will dam-
age their reputation for treating their suppliers fairly. As a consequence, even 
when they terminate for cause, buyers are careful to give suppliers enough no-																																																								
26 A high-ranked manager at a large supplier explained that his company had no fear of being 
sued by an OEM for a breach of contract so long as it was doing its best to fix any problems that 
had been identified. He explained that in his many years working at the supplier he remembered 
no lawsuits and that he could not imagine an OEM suing unless the supplier was doing some-
thing deliberately opportunistic or acting like it simply did not care. Interview with Manager at 
Large Supplier (Dec. 2015). 
27 Interview with Counsel to Large OEM (Dec. 2015). 
28 Interview with a High Ranking Strategic Sourcing Manager at a Large Mid-Western OEM 
(May 2014). 
29 Interview with In-house Health Care Outsourcing Lawyer (July 2014). Even firms as promi-
nent as Apple Inc. are concerned about the way they are perceived by their suppliers. See infra 
text accompanying notes 145-146.  
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tice and enough transitional business to enable them to find other customers. 
They also tend to compensate them for their reliance expenses even though this 
is not contractually required.  
OEM termination decisions are also influenced by the simple fact that it is of-
ten cheaper to help a supplier fix its problems and improve its operations than it 
is to bear the high cost of switching suppliers. As a mid-western OEM explained, 
“It takes a lot for a supplier to get in a position where we are going to re-source 
their business. They almost have to make an effort . . . Re-sourcing business . . . 
takes a lot of time, a lot of effort . . . If we are noticing problems, we will get 
some level of materials leadership involvement to see what the issues are.”30  
Although OEMs are reluctant to sue or terminate suppliers, most MSAs con-
tain a self-help damage remedy that enables buyers to obtain some monetary 
compensation without ending a relationship. These remedy provisions (“interior 
remedies”) typically permit a buyer to withhold payment and impose a small 
fine when a nonconforming or late tender is made. The fine usually falls far short 
of compensating the buyer for breach, but is often quite significant from the per-
spective of suppliers, many of whom operate on a slim (or leveraged) cash flow 
margin.31 In practice, some firms impose these fines whenever delivery is non-
conforming, while others only impose them after a problem occurs several times 
or the supplier ignores a request to provide a plan to eliminate a documented 
problem. As one procurement manager explained, her firm tended to impose 
these fines only when the relationship with the supplier was deteriorating, or 
when she wanted to get the attention of more senior managers who could see to 
it that the underlying problem was corrected.32 As a consequence, the effect of 
these fines on work-a-day behavior is likely to vary widely across firms. 																																																								
30 NOE Respondent. Even in the auto industry where buyer-supplier relationships are notori-
ously uncooperative, buyers often find it in their self-interest both to be flexible and to help their 
suppliers, even at their own expense. See Whitford (2006, 65) (“The unwritten policy, seldom dis-
cussed publicly by GM [a company with a very bad reputation, is] . . . that the automaker is pre-
pared to help some suppliers rather than risk part shortages . . . GM has hastened payments for 
parts, guaranteed future contracts, postponed price cuts, offered consulting, and even raised the 
prices paid for components . . .The automakers do these things because they know it would be 
time consuming and costly to replace certain parts makers.”). 
31 This structure might be used as a way of ensuring that the buyer has little incentive to im-
pose the fine unless performance is truly nonconforming. 
32 Interview with Procurement VP at Large Medical Machine OEM. See also Stuart et al. (1998, 
85) (noting that while Allen Bradley, a manufacturer of factory automation parts, adopted a plan 
to penalize noncompliance with quality metrics by fining suppliers an amount equal to the cost 
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In sum, a buyer’s threat to seek court-imposed damages for breach of contract 
is diluted by damage limitations, the structure of these transactions, and the pos-
sibility that the supplier will be judgment proof.33 And, while the threat of termi-
nation is nominally quite strong, its exercise is tempered by the high cost of 
switching suppliers as well as by buyers’ desire to maintain a reputation for fair-
ness. Legal remedies are also of limited value to most suppliers. They fear that 
suing a customer would hurt their reputation. And, as one midsize supplier apt-
ly observed, ”You get long-term agreements, but [they are of limited value be-
cause] I can’t outspend them in court.”34   
Together, these considerations suggest that the shadow of the law is not, 
standing alone, strong enough to create sufficient incentives for suppliers to 
meet their contractual commitments.  
2. Hierarchy-Type Methods of Inducing Performance 
Against the background of the legal remedies available, OEM buyers, who 
tend to operate on close to a just-in-time basis and whose production line relies 
on hundreds of suppliers simultaneously meeting their obligations, are not con-
tent to rely on mere promises to perform or the shadow effects of potential court-
imposed monetary sanctions to induce the level of performance they require. Ra-
ther, to increase the likelihood that their suppliers will perform as promised, 
they have developed a variety of methods that either recreate or approximate the 
core management techniques associated with intra-firm hierarchy.35 
To ensure that products meet their quality specifications, OEMs go to great 
lengths to regulate the production processes used in suppliers’ plants. In some 
instances, they also exert influence over sub-suppliers’ plants.36 Most require 																																																																																																																																																																					
of remedying the defect, it ultimately decided to report, but not collect, the amount of the would-
be fine in an effort “to use the figures to foster awareness rather than to assess penalties”). 
33 These suppliers tend to operate on a slim cash flow margin. Given that many buyers oper-
ate on the basis of something close to just-in-time inventory practices, consequential damages (if 
not limited by contract as they usually are) might lead all but the largest suppliers to file for 
bankruptcy. 
34 NOE Respondent. 
35 See Stinchcombe (1990, 199) (setting out the five elements of “hierarchical intra-firm struc-
ture,” namely “labor contracts, fiduciary relations, the exercised right to measure and reward 
performances, standard operating procedures and decision making and dispute resolving meet-
ings,” four of which (fiduciary relations excepted) are recreated in OEM-supplier outsourcing 
agreements).  
36 Some buyers confine their oversight to first-tier suppliers. Others put restrictions on which 
firms their first-tier supplier may buy from and require all sub-suppliers to comply with many of 
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suppliers to operate their plants in conformity with the quality and manufactur-
ing standards set by the International Standards Organization,37 the Automotive 
Industry Action Group, or any of a number of other standard setting groups. 
They also impose additional requirements that are designed to better tailor these 
standards to their individual company’s particular needs.  
John Deere, for example, requires its suppliers to operate their plants in com-
pliance with the detailed quality and manufacturing process-related specifica-
tions set out in the eighty-eight page John Deere Quality Manual.38 Among other 
things the Manual sets forth: nine approved process control methods;39 twenty-
five approved quality control tools that can each be used at different stages of 
the production process;40 numerous Deere-approved production standards; a 
requirement that the supplier train internal auditors who understand Deere’s 
requirements;41 and the requirements for participating in Deere’s structured pro-
cess for the development and introduction of new products consisting of six 
phases and twenty-one carefully delineated milestones. The manual also speci-
fies many points in the production process where Deere personnel must sign off 
before the supplier is permitted to move on to the next stage.42 Together the re-																																																																																																																																																																					
the requirements they impose on their tier-one suppliers. In general the tier-one suppliers are 
responsible for monitoring their sub-suppliers and ensuring that they comply with these re-
quirements. Some buyers require both suppliers and their sub-suppliers to agree to be audited by 
the buyer at any time. See Ingersoll (2014, 5 “Quality”). 
37 See, e.g., International Standards Organization, ISO 9001. 
38 The quality manual in turn explicitly incorporates the John Deere Supplier Code of Conduct, 
Deere (2015), John Deere Standards, and the John Deere Restricted Materials List. See also: Navistar 
(2013) (a 29-page manual covering most of the same subjects as the Deere manual); Ingersoll 
(2014) (same); Kohler, Global Supplier Quality Manual, 
http://www.kohler.com/corp/supplier/SQM_GPI_3009_Rev1_1_2008.pdf (covering the same 
subjects as the Deere manual but in somewhat less detail). It is important to note that while the 
requirements of these manuals are onerous, many of their provisions are simply company-
specific refinements of ISO standards. A Deere manager estimated that 80% of the Deere re-
quirements could be categorized this way. Interview with Senior Supply Chain Manager of Large 
OEM (Apr. 15, 2014). 
39 Deere QM (2009, Sec. 24, “Process Control Methods”). 
40 Deere QM (2009, Sec. 25, “Suggested Quality Tools”). 
41 Deere QM (2009, Sec. 5.6.1) (“Management Review - General“). 
42 For example, before a new part is produced, a “Design, Process and Assembly Review” 
must be held. This review includes “a meeting which confirms all expectations of the product or 
services prior to a physical build. John Deere teams initiate this review as early as possible before 
tooling release.” Deere QM (2009, Sec. 7.2.1, “Determination of Requirements Related to the 
Product”). Similar meetings must be also held when there are significant changes to existing 
products. And, when the quality of the product to be produced “cannot be verified by subse-
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quirements of Deere’s Supplier Quality Manual are so extensive that they 
amount to Deere dictating the standard operating procedures to be used at its 
suppliers’ plants—procedures that are generally considered a feature of intra-
firm hierarchy.  
Similarly, Cummins too imposes detailed standard operating procedures on 
its suppliers. It also goes a step further and appoints one of its own employees, 
dubbed a Supplier Quality Improvement Engineer (“SQIE”), to both manage and 
oversee production at each of its suppliers’ plants. The SQIE is given broad rang-
ing authority over the way the supplier runs its production line and the types of 
quality control methods it is required to use.43 Almost any change the supplier 
might want to make in its sourcing or operations,44 as well as the methods used 
to produce any new products, must be approved by the SQIE.45 The SQIE also 
has the authority to request “data above & beyond the stated requirements in 
the . . . Handbook if it is deemed pertinent to protect the interests of Cum-
mins,”46 and is given broad ranging discretion to deal with situations that are not 
covered in the Supplier Handbook.47  
																																																																																																																																																																					
quent monitoring or measurement,” the supplier must submit a verification warrant validating 
the “qualification of processes, qualification of equipment and personnel, and use of defined 
methodologies and procedures, requests for records and re-validation,” after which John Deere 
reviews the submission and approves or rejects the verification warrant. (Sec. 7.5.2, “Validation of 
Processes for Production and Service Provision”).  
43 For example, the SQIE is also given the authority to: designate various engineering stand-
ards as “key characteristics” for the purposes of Six Sigma, Cummins (2010, Sec. E(6)(d)); require 
a supplier to participate in Cummins-developed quality programs, (Sec 8.5); designate the num-
ber of samples required for various types of approvals, (Sec. L(3)(d)); require the use of “statisti-
cal tools for managing and improving processes ” (Sec. 8.6); require the supplier to keep particu-
lar types of records (Sec. N(2)); “check the suppliers’ actions,” taken as part of an audit (Sec. 
M(2)(b)); waive certain paperwork requirements, (Sec. Q(2)); and set time frames for suppliers to 
take particular actions related to product development and introduction. 
44 Among other things, the SQIE must approve: any change in the supplier’s supply base (or 
even the plant the supplier buys from), Cummins (2010, Sec. N(1)(c)); any change in production 
processes, (Sec. N(1)(b)); and the processes a supplier proposes to use to complete a rework order 
after defects in deliverables has been discovered. (Sec. M(1)).  
45 Cummins (2010, Sec. E(24)) (“No new or changed parts can be shipped to Cummins,” unless 
the methods used to produce them have been “approved by a Cummins SQIE.”). 
46 Cummins (2010, G(9)). 
47 Cummins (2010, I9) (“It is impossible to cover every conceivable situation with a blanket 
statement or definition. If a situation occurs that is not covered by the Cummins Supplier Hand-
book, the Cummins SQIE is the point of contact for getting questions answered and situations 
resolved.”). 
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The broad discretion vested in the SQIE and the authority he has to adminis-
tratively deal with needed changes, are just the “strong” types of “administra-
tive control[s]” that are well-suited to tasks involving a need for “coordinated 
adaptation,” and that are typically viewed as hallmarks of the types of hierar-
chical management techniques traditionally associated with intra-firm produc-
tion.48 
Another core type of control associated with intra-firm production governed 
by hierarchy is control over labor, and with it the ability to reward good perfor-
mance. OEMs seek to exercise control and oversight over their suppliers’ labor 
force in many ways. For example, they require particular supplier employees to 
participate in buyer- (or in some instances supplier-) run training programs49 
and have buyer personnel (like the Cummins SQIE) present at the supplier’s 
plant to oversee operations and decide what changes are permissible. They also 
dictate aspects of their suppliers’ HR policies.50 In the past, buyers attempted to 
assert even more control over suppliers’ labor force by dictating the bonus to be 
paid to production managers and workers if certain targets were met.51 However, 
a Department of Labor ruling led lawyers to advise against this practice, so it 																																																								
48 See Tadelis & Williamson (2013) (describing the functional attributes of intra-firm hierarchy 
that give “make” an advantage over “buy”). 
49 See Ingersoll (2014, Sec. 2.1 “Training”) (requiring their suppliers to describe the skill sets need-
ed by their manufacturing personnel and to provide documentation that all employees working 
on the production-line have been trained to these standards). 
50 Deere QM (2009, Sec. 6.2, “Human Resources”) (“A supplier shall provide a system of ongoing 
monitoring of each employee’s education, training and work experience and provide opportuni-
ties for training and continuing education to improve employee’s skill level . . . The training shall 
provide employees with an awareness of the relevance and importance of their activities and 
how they contribute to the achievement of quality objectives in the business plan. John Deere 
classes for Supplier Quality Manual, John Deere Standards, and Enterprise Product Delivery Pro-
cess Supply Chain Integration are available”). Similarly, Honda-US’s involvement in, and over-
sight of, its core suppliers’ operations includes many functions that closely resemble hierarchy. 
Honda “reviews the supplier’s sales, overall financial situation, annual business plans, technolo-
gy development, and investment plans, and . . . reviews measures such as employee turnover, 
working conditions, safety issues, absenteeism, management attitude and their use of temporary 
manpower.” See Choi & Hong (2002, 477). 
51 Interview with Outsourcing Lawyer (Nov. 2014). See also Overby (2009) (recommending, in 
the context of IT outsourcing, that when “cash incentives are paid, ask the supplier to pay a large 
portion of the money to staff assigned to the customer’s account . . . this helps to attract and re-
tain the supplier’s best people on the customer’s account”). In addition, MSAs frequently have 
provisions requiring disputes that cannot be resolved by lower-level managers to be discussed at 
progressively higher levels of both the OEM and the supplier’s organizations, before being sub-
mitted to litigation—a practice that echoes intra-firm dispute resolution procedures (see, e.g., 
Deere and Stanadyne Agreement, supra note 15 at Sec. XXII(6)(1)). 
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was dropped. Nevertheless, many MSAs include provisions specifying by name 
the supplier’s employees who will be involved in overseeing the contract. They 
also include processes for choosing replacements if these employees leave the 
supplier’s employ.  
Not every OEM engages in such extensive participation in and oversight of 
their suppliers’ operations. Some buyers reserve this scrutiny for their suppliers 
of complex or critical parts.52 Others engage in intense intervention and over-
sight, either at the beginning of a contracting relationship or when a new prod-
uct is introduced but lessen their engagement as the relationship develops.53  
 Nevertheless, while OEMs differ in terms of their oversight of manufacturing 
and the degree to which their contracting practices incorporate hierarchy-type 
governance techniques, the core point is that OEM buyers, many of whom oper-
ate on a just-in-time inventory basis, do not simply contract, wait for delivery, 
accept or reject, and then sue if cure is not forthcoming. Rather, they interact 
with their suppliers throughout the production, delivery, and quality assessment 
process to try and catch problems sooner rather than later and work together to 
solve problems rather than threatening one another with lawsuits. It is in this 
respect that many of the work-a-day practices in the manufacturing world today 
echo the findings of Stewart Macaulay’s seminal study,54 only with a subtle dif-
ference: these collaborative relational interactions may look informal, but in real-
ity they are shaped and supported by the provisions of highly formal written 
agreements, agreed allocations of discretionary authority, and an array of formal 
contract administration mechanisms. The core contract provisions and contract 
administration mechanisms that together with the force of network governance, 																																																								
52 Interview with Counsel to Large OEM (Dec. 2015). 
53 As one manager at a large supplier explained, firms like Deere spend a lot of time at the 
plants of new suppliers. As time passes, if quality is constantly good, they will generally lessen 
their involvement. However, they will still make plant visits on at least a monthly basis and will 
step up their involvement if the supplier scorecard reveals problems. Interview with Large Sup-
plier (Dec. 15, 2015). See also Osram Sylvania, Global Automotive Lighting: Supplier Handbook, 
https://assets.sylvania.com/assets/Documents/Supplier%20Handbook.5a5ab44b-f983-49a7-
b12e-0cc68a32596c.pdf at 15 (describing how firms move from “Material Inspection Department 
Quarantine” status, where incoming product is extensively tested, to “ship to stock” status where 
it is not); National Instruments, NI Supplier Handbook, 
http://www.ni.com/company/suppliers/supplierhandbook.htm at 9 (describing their Dock-to-
Stock Program).   
54 See Macaulay (1963) (quoting interviews that reflect the informality and flexibility of day-to-
day contracting behavior and the desire of businessmen to keep lawyers and references to “the 
contract” out of their transactions). 
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enable these seemingly informal and highly co-operative contracting relation-
ships to emerge are discussed further below. 
II. FACILITATING THE EMERGENCE OF COOPERATIVE CONTRACTING RELATION-
SHIPS 
Large industrial buyers have created a variety of contract administrative 
mechanisms and other institutional structures that make it possible for coopera-
tive contracting relationships—that is, relationships where shirking is minimized, 
relationship-specific investments are adequately bonded, and opportunistic be-
havior is adequately controlled—to arise and endure largely outside of the shad-
ow of the law. The most important such mechanisms are described below. 
1. Preconditions for Cooperation to Emerge 
In order for cooperation to emerge, both the buyer and the supplier must de-
cide to cooperate at the outset of their contracting relationship, and each must 
also believe (or behave as if it believes) that that the other will do the same. 
Thereafter they must each respond to cooperation with cooperation, and defec-
tion, or a certain number of defections, with either defection or gradated defec-
tion.  
A buyer and supplier’s initial expectation that their contracting partner will 
cooperate is created in part by buyer-administered supplier qualification pro-
grams.55 These programs require potential suppliers to provide: detailed finan-
cial information; information about the identity of their other contracting part-
ners and the percentage of their output they sell to each; contact information for 
both current and past customers;56 and documentation that their quality control 
systems comply with international standards. Buyers also conduct thorough in-
spections of suppliers’ plants and interview both managerial and production-line 
level employees. In addition to these formal information channels, procurement 
managers often investigate potential suppliers through their more informal busi-
ness contacts, through their own employees who may have worked at or with 
particular suppliers in the past, and through the web and business press.57  																																																								
55 For a summary of one such program, see Cummins (2010, Sec. I “Supplier Selection”). 
56 Interview with Counsel to a Large OEM (Dec. 1, 2015); Interview with Supply Chain Man-
ager at Medical Machinery Corporation (Dec. 2014). 
57  See, e.g., Hewlett Packard, Supply Chain Responsibility: Our Approach, 
http://h20195.www2.hp.com/V2/GetPDF.aspx/c03742930.pdf at 4 (“[I]nsight from . . . press 
articles . . . may also affect our assessments of supplier risk); Interview with Supply Chain VP 
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Supplier qualification programs are costly for a buyer to administer and ex-
pensive for a putative supplier to complete. Once the supplier has been qualified 
and the firms begin to transact, both firms will be acutely aware that if either de-
cides to exit the relationship, they will lose this investment and both will also 
face significant switching costs. As a consequence, both firms are likely to begin 
the relationship by cooperating and to assume that their contracting partner will 
do the same.58 To strengthen this expectation, at the start of a new relationship, 
buyers typically place small purchase orders, slowly increasing the order size if 
performance is up to the their expectations. Given this, in the early stages of their 
relationship, it is unlikely that either transactor would obtain a large enough 
payoff from defecting to make it desirable to incur the associated costs. Each par-
ty is therefore likely to begin early production rounds by cooperating. 
2. Conditions for Maintaining Cooperation  
Once a cooperative contracting relationship has been established, it is most 
likely to endure if the transactors have a common understanding of what consti-
tutes cooperation and are able to reliably distinguish acts of cooperation from 
acts of defection. The biggest threat to continued cooperation is the possibility 
that a transactor will misclassify an act of cooperation as an act of defection and 
thus set off a series of actions and reactions that lead to the disintegration of the 
contracting relationship.59 Given the detail in these contracts and the fact that 																																																																																																																																																																					
from a Large Health Care Machine Company (July 2013) (noting that before doing business with 
a supplier she would check it out with her contacts in other firms the supplier dealt with as well 
as with other individuals she knew in the supplier’s local area). 
58 Fichman & Levinthal (1991) (suggesting that “favorable prior beliefs, trust, goodwill, finan-
cial resources or psychological commitment,” give rise to an “initial stock of assets,” that create a 
honeymoon period, (defined as a ”suspension of the threat of a relationship ending,”) at the out-
set of commercial relationships, but providing limited empirical support from business settings, 
outside of one study that found such a period to exist at the outset of auditor-client relationships 
but that needs to be viewed with caution as the negative market signal sent by firms who change 
their auditors early in a relationship might well account for the effect). 
59 Bernstein has explored the role played by clear contracts, institutional efforts to promote 
common knowledge, and the availability of formalist adjudicators whose decisions are predicta-
ble in sustaining cooperation in the shadow of the cotton industry’s well-developed private legal 
system, see Bernstein (2001). Similarly, Bozovic & Hadfield (2015) recognize that written con-
tracts can support, or in their terms “scaffold” cooperation even when they are rarely (and are 
rarely expected to be) legally enforced. However, in their account (unlike the one presented here) 
both lawyers and the content of contract law play a central role in enabling the written agreement 
to scaffold cooperative exchange. As they explain, cooperation can be achieved because “a dis-
tinctive body of contract law and practice [that includes “formal legal doctrine” as well as the 
“norms and rules of contract analysis”] coordinates the interpretation of ambiguous and multi-
dimensional events by the parties to a contractual relationship,” thereby enabling “those events 
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buyers expect strict compliance regarding quality, on time delivery, and a host of 
logistics-related requirements, the potential for relationships to unravel due to 
either a supplier’s misunderstanding of a buyer’s needs or a buyer’s mistaken 
classification of operational outcomes is omnipresent; yet buyers have developed 
ways to reduce both of these risks and moderate their responses to bad outcomes 
in ways that are designed to facilitate continued cooperation without opening the 
door to opportunism.  
A. Reducing the Risk of Misunderstanding  
Large buyers take many steps to reduce the likelihood that suppliers will mis-
understand either their contract requirements or their unwritten expectations. 
John Deere’s supplier portal, for example, includes webinars and PowerPoint 
presentations that explain the requirements of its quality manual and highlight 
the “critical” requirements, the violation of which will “put the supplier at the 
highest risk of violating the Purchase Order Terms and Conditions.”60 Caterpillar 
runs a Supplier Development College, which offers a variety of on-boarding clas-
ses for new suppliers designed to increase their understanding of Caterpillar’s 
contract requirements and unwritten expectations.61 Suppliers are also encour-
aged to improve their operations by attending Caterpillar University which of-
fers courses on the latest industrial techniques, regulatory requirements, and 
quality control methods.62 Navistar takes a somewhat different approach. It re-																																																																																																																																																																					
to be classified in a binary fashion as ‘breach’ or ‘not breach,’” and reducing the “variance associ-
ated with the estimates of the likelihood that contracting events will be classified as breach or not 
(5).”  
60 Deere QM (2009, p. 3). Other buyers produce manuals to enhance suppliers’ understanding 
of their contract requirements. See, e.g., GE Energy Supplier Quality Resource Book (Mar. 2006) 
(providing an accessible overview of GE’s quality requirements but warning that it “is not a sub-
stitute for a rigorous contract and document review by the supplier as part of the process to fulfill 
an order”).  
61 Courses offered include “Supplier Expectations Workshop” and “Understanding Purchase 
Order Terms and Conditions.”  
62 See, e.g., Supplier Development College, 
https://supplierconnect.cat.com/wps/portal/catconnect/SDC (describing on-boarding classes 
for new suppliers that teach them how to do business with Caterpillar; courses on aspects of 
manufacturing ranging from asbestos control to lead to crane safety; and a class on “Meeting 
Customer Expectations.” Similarly, John Deere provides “classes for the Supplier Quality Manual, 
John Deere Standards, and Enterprise Product Delivery Process and Supply Chain Integration.” 
See Deere QM (2009, Sec. 6.2, “Human Resources”). See also Navistar (2013) (noting that a train-
ing module is available online for each stage in the Supplier Quality Life Cycle Management re-
quirements and that managers are required to complete them). 
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quires its suppliers to confirm in writing that they understand all Navistar speci-
fications before accepting any business.63 It also mandates that its suppliers’ key 
personnel participate in various web-based training programs, among them a 
program designed to “take our quality expectations beyond statements of expec-
tation to training in the important aspects of quality that will deliver to our ex-
pectations.”64 Harley too has “a large variety of training types for [its] suppliers,” 
including “a highly formalized methodology for instructing suppliers that can 
last up to three months,” as well as “training for the Master Supply Agree-
ment[].”65 
Although these formal channels for conveying information are important, 
suppliers also come to understand their buyers’ needs and expectations through 
the manager-led process of negotiating product specifications and the provisions 
of Service Level Agreements and/or Statements of Work, including the key per-
formance indicators that will be used to assess performance. The information 
learned in these negotiating sessions about the culture and expectations of each 
company is viewed by many transactors as being important to the successful 
conduct and governance of these relationships. Some consider it to be more even 
important than the final written agreements.66 
B. Reducing the Risk of Misclassification  
Buyers have also created a formal contract administration mechanism, the 
Supplier Scorecard, to rate each supplier in terms of their compliance with rela-
tively objective performance metrics as well as the buyer’s assessment of the 																																																								
63 Navistar (2013, Sec. 3.3) (“Suppliers must ensure that Navistar requirements are defined and 
understood prior to acceptance of business . . . and return the Supplier Quotation Feasibility 
Commitment to confirm understanding of Navistar requirements. When an aspect of require-
ments is not understood or agreed, suppliers must provide a written request for explanation of 
the unclear points to the appropriate Navistar Engineer, the supporting Navistar Supplier Quali-
ty Representative, and Navistar Procurement Representative. If no questions are raised, Navistar 
assumes that suppliers understand the requirements and will adhere to them.”). 
64 Lisboa & Osborne (2014). Navistar also produces webinars explaining its quality manual 
and requires its suppliers to complete them. See 
http://www.navistarsupplier.com/IntegratedSupplierQuality/QualityDocuments.aspx.  
65 ManagementParadise.com, Supply Chain Management of Harley Davidson (Jan. 8, 2011), 
http://www.managementparadise.com/forums/elements-logistics/212454-supply-chain-
management-harley-davidson-inc.html. 
66 See, e.g., Karten (2003) (“A properly established SLA fosters improved communication be-
tween the two parties . . . the very process of establishing an SLA helps to strengthen communica-
tion, so that the parties come to better understand each others’ needs, priorities, and concerns.”). 
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quality of the contracting relationship more generally.67 The core metrics that 
make up the bulk of most scorecards are on-time performance, cost, quality, and 
customer service. The buyer uses these metrics to create a quarterly composite 
score, which it then uses to determine the business opportunities (if any) that it 
will make available to the supplier in the next quarter.  
By rating on a quarterly rather than purchase-order-by-purchase-order basis, 
buyers are less likely to overreact to isolated bad outcomes. Under the scorecard 
system, the highest-rated suppliers are eligible for new business. Those with ad-
equate ratings keep their existing levels of business but are expected to improve. 
And suppliers with lower ratings are warned that their order quantities will de-
crease if improvements are not quickly made. Many buyers accompany these 
warnings with consulting services designed to improve their operation.68 It is on-
ly after a few rounds of low ratings that suppliers are terminated.69 Among other 
things,70 this mechanism enables buyers to reward suppliers for their perfor-
mance by allocating them increased business.71 It also enables them to impose 
carefully graduated monetary sanctions on them for non-performance without 
having to end the contracting relationship to do so. These sanctions do not bene-
fit the buyer,72 and may be costly for him to impose because he will have to se-																																																								
67 See, e.g., National Instruments’ Supplier Scorecard Assessment Criteria (2011) (defining the 
allocation of points on the NI supplier scorecard and indicating that the only subjective element, 
the score for “customer service and support,” was allocated only 10 out of 100 points.”). 
68 Milligan & Carbone (2000, 65) (stating that, according to Harley, “[i]f a supplier receives a 
bad report card, Harley-Davidson takes action. If the Supplier is not doing well, we send re-
sources in to help him.”). 
69  See Richard Menhorn, NCR: Supplier Scorecard Procedure (June 25, 2010), 
http://www.ncr.com/wp-content/uploads/ncr-supplier-scorecard-process.doc (describing the 
operation of the NCR company’s scorecard). 
70 In firms that are multi-sourced, these scorecards give the buyer an inexpensive way to 
benchmark suppliers’ performance against one another.  
71 The prospect of these non-legal rewards like increased business or a public announcement 
of partner level status that the buyer can use to solicit business (an action that would otherwise 
be forbidden under the terms of most master agreements), play an important role alongside non-
legal sanctions in supporting these agreements—most notably in creating incentives for more 
than mere compliance with contract provisions. 
72 These “sanctions” are very costly to the seller and do not benefit the buyer (and are in fact 
costly for it to impose), so they are best understood as a form of decoupled damages. See Polin-
sky & Che (1991, 562) (“The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant’s payment as 
high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing 
the plaintiff’s incentive to sue—and hence litigation costs—without sacrificing the defendant’s 
incentive to exercise care.”). 
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cure other sources of supply to cover reduced quantities. He is therefore unlikely 
to impose them unless the supplier has actually underperformed.73 
OEMs and suppliers meet quarterly to discuss the scorecard. Buyers share 
their perspective on the scorecard and suppliers are encouraged to ask questions, 
dispute various ratings, and describe their plans to improve in critical areas. The-
se discussions increase transparency. They make it less likely that a supplier will 
respond with a defection of its own if the buyer makes an errant judgment about 
the quality of its performance. Even if the supplier ultimately disagrees with the 
buyer’s assessments and explanations, he is nonetheless much less likely to con-
clude that its scorecard rating (provided the buyer provides a plausible rationale) 
is an independent defection on the part of the buyer. The scorecard, together 
with the quarterly business review, serves as a useful, though far from foolproof, 
way of heading off a mistaken series of echoing defections that has the potential 
to lead to the deterioration or end of an otherwise beneficial contracting relation-
ship. 
The incentives created by the scorecard are reinforced by buyers’ practice of 
granting status designations, like “partner-level”74 or “certified” supplier to 
those suppliers who continue to meet or exceed specified performance criteria. 
Some of these designations come with valuable benefits, such as better or more 
extensive information sharing, more frequent contact, dock-to-stock status,75 and 
the award of new business even when they are not the lowest bidder so long as 
they are within a specified range of the lowest bidder.76 In addition, it is not un-																																																								
73 In addition, in contexts where the buyer multi-sources the good, the scorecard creates a 
tournament among the suppliers, and puts them in a prisoner’s dilemma vis-à-vis the revelation 
of some types of information. For example, when a supplier knows that the buyer can compare 
his statements about the lowest achievable error rate with those of other producers, he is more 
likely to be truthful.  
74 See, e.g. John Deere, Achieving Excellence: A Strategy for World-Class Supplier Relationships, 
(n.d.) 
https://jdsupply.deere.com/apps/ae/docs/brochure_inserts/english/english_brochure.pdf at 4. 
75  Sloan Global Supplier Quality Manual, 
https://www.sloanvalve.com/GQA_SUPPLIER_MANUAL_7-2013_(Rev_6).pdf (7-2013 Rev. 6, 
2013) at 4 (noting that “certified’ suppliers get ‘dock-to-stock’ status . . . [and are] exempt from 
the receiving inspection process at Sloan facilities”). 
76 At the Ariens Corporation, for example, certified suppliers receive “preferential treatment 
from the OEM . . . While [they] are expected to come up with cost saving ideas, they enjoy part-
nership style relationships with Ariens, particularly in engineering. In bidding, if they can come 
within five percent of the lowest bid, they get the order.” See Rickert et al. (2000, 17). See also Ab-
erdeen Group, The Supplier Performance Measurement Benchmarking Report, 
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common for supplier qualification questionnaires to ask if the supplier is a “certi-
fied” supplier to any of its customers,77 which suggests that obtaining certified 
status may be a valuable business asset. 
To ensure that suppliers who reach the highest status category have an incen-
tive to maintain high-level performance, firms have created supplier-of-the-year 
awards. These awards are covered in the business press78 and are considered an 
indication of quality by other buyers when they are selecting suppliers.79 By an-
nouncing the award publicly, the buyer confers a benefit on the supplier. The 
supplier can then use the award to solicit other business, something that it might 
otherwise be prohibited from doing. The confidentiality provisions in MSAs of-
ten forbid suppliers from disclosing even the existence of a contracting relation-
ship without the buyer’s consent.80 Sometimes the mere fact that a supplier sells 
to Deere is an important business asset as other putative buyers will know that 
																																																																																																																																																																					
http://www.lyonsinfo.com/_resources/aberdeen_spms_report.pdf (Dec. 2002) (noting that “en-
terprises often give new business proposals (i.e., “bids”) from preferred suppliers additional 
weight, allowing preferred suppliers to win new business without necessarily being the lowest 
priced offer.”). 
77  See, e.g., Supplier Questionnaire for Ceredyne Corp., 
http://www.ceradyne.com/uploads/supplierdocs/662011102210AMSupplier%20Questionnaire
.pdf at 4 (asking prospective suppliers “is your facility a certified supplier for any other custom-
er . . . if yes please provide customer name if possible.”). 
78 Despite widespread coverage in the press, empirical evidence on the effect on suppliers’ 
businesses of winning these awards is conflicting. Compare Hendricks & Singhal (1996) (looking 
solely at buyer quality focused awards given to public companies and finding no abnormal re-
turns on the day after the announcement) and Hendricks & Singhal (2001) (using a different 
methodology and finding that winning a buyer-granted quality award resulted in a 28.24% 
“mean percent change in operating income.”). See also Azadegan & Pai (2008) (concluding, based 
on data from the semi-conductor sector, that buyer-given “awards are an indicator of long-term 
supplier performance,” and that “operational awards show direct association with ROE, [while] 
product awards show direct association with sales growth.”).  
79 Interview with Supply Chain VP from a Large Health Care Machine Company (July 2013) 
(explaining that while not determinative in the selection of a new supplier, she would sometimes 
give the receipt of these awards some weight); Interview with Deere Supply Chain Manager 
(same).  
80 See, e.g., Supply Agreement between John Deere & Titan Tire Company, (Apr. 15, 2011) at Cl. 22 
(“[N]o press release, public announcement, confirmation, or other information regarding supply 
orders for the Products under this Agreement, or the fact that negotiations for new products or 
increased quantities for existing order are occurring, will be made by Titan without the prior 
written approval of Deere or by Deere without the prior written approval of Titan.”) See also 
Supply Contract between Phoenix Technologies Ltd. & Intel Corp. (Dec. 18, 1995) at Sec. 8.2 (providing 
for similar confidentiality). 
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the supplier has learned to run an efficient plant by virtue of Deere’s oversight 
and assistance. 
Buyers also obtain a prospective benefit from these status designations and 
awards. Once it is announced that a supplier has reached partner status or is the 
Supplier of the Year, a supplier who fails to win similar accolades in future years 
will suffer reputational harm. Knowing this, suppliers who win these coveted 
designations have an incentive to continue to perform at a high level in the fu-
ture.   
The MSAs also have provisions designed to improve the accuracy of the buy-
er’s assessment of the supplier’s performance and to enable the buyer to better 
understand the causes of any nonperformance. They give buyers the right to: in-
spect the supplier’s plant with or without notice, review and audit its quality 
control systems81 and quality control reports,82 and audit its books and/or other 
records.83 While books and records are always subject to manipulation,84 the 																																																								
81 See Deere QM (2009, Sec. 8.2.2, “Internal Audit”) (“Deere reserves the right to conduct a 
quality system assessment at the suppliers’ facility . . . Deere would expect access to a supplier’s 
personnel, documentation, . . .and test facilities”); see also Primary Contract Manufacturing Agree-
ment between JDS Uniphase and Fabrinet (January 1, 2008) at Sec. 10.1 (setting out broad inspection 
and quality control rights as well as requiring “reasonable access to its staff including technical 
staff, to determine the identity and scope of Improvements and New Technology whether solely 
or jointly developed by Supplier, which JDSU reasonably believes Supplier has not adequately 
disclosed in accordance with this Agreement”). 
82 See, e.g., Deere QM (2009, Sec. 4.2.4, “Control of Records”) (“[A]ll quality records” including 
but not limited to twenty five enumerated types, must be “readily accessible upon request by a 
John Deere representative.”). 
83 See, e.g., Fuel Supply Agreement between Petro Truckstops and Petro Stopping Centers (March 9, 
2007) at Sec. 3 (“Each party shall . . . maintain and make . . . books and records available for at 
least two (2) years after the termination of this Agreement for possible inspection, copying, ex-
tracting and/or audit by the other party. Each party . . . shall have the right not more than once 
every six calendar months to review and, through an independent certified public accounting 
firm . . . conduct audits with respect to the books, records, and all other documents and materials 
in the possession or under the control of the other party relating to this Agreement.”). More gen-
erally, these provisions give buyers the right to get almost all of the information they would get 
through civil discovery without having to file a lawsuit. 
84 See, e.g., NOE Respondent (explaining, when asked if they give up their costing information 
to their largest OEM buyers, “somewhat, we take our material . . . then we just have a dinosaur 
way of doing labor costs . . . we don’t break it down. The upshot is that [the OEM] can’t see the 
margins”); NOE Respondent (explaining that when they were compelled to give their costing 
data to a large OEM, “we’ve done it to such an extent that they had an extremely hard time un-
derstanding it,” and noting this was a deliberate tactic). NOE Respondent (explaining that while 
the overall margins they reveal across all parts they make for a buyer are roughly accurate, the 
data related to a particular product are less accurate to avoid push back from buyers). 
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provisions nevertheless give buyers important (albeit not perfect) information 
that they can use to more accurately determine if, and in some instances why, 
sellers are violating certain types of contract provisions.  
OEMs care deeply about the reasons for poor quality, late delivery, or any 
other type of subpar performance. The reason for a breach influences their re-
sponse.85 Breaches due to one-off manufacturing glitches are largely ignored, un-
less they are frequent. Breaches due to systematic production problems (even 
large ones) that the buyer thinks can be remedied are initially met with offers of 
technical assistance,86  sometimes at the buyer’s expense. And opportunistic 
breaches or breaches caused by operational difficulties that cannot be remedied 
are typically met with the harshest responses, including termination for cause.  
To enable buyers to determine the causes of a particular breach, most con-
tracts give them the right to demand a “root cause analysis,” when a problem 
arises. A root cause analysis is “a tool designed to help identify not only what and 
how an event occurred, but also why it happened.”87 A properly conducted root 
cause analysis should also be able to determine whether the type of process prob-
lems that caused the undesirable outcome are amenable ”to specif[ic] workable 
corrective measures that [will] prevent future events of the type observed.”88  
Together, these audit/oversight and root cause provisions reduce the likeli-
hood that a buyer will mistakenly classify a one-off industrial mishap as defec-
tion and thus set off a chain of reactions that either terminate or severely damage 																																																								
85 See, e.g., Harley Davidson (2003, “Late Delivery Module”) (providing that a supplier who 
delivers late will not be liable for any “of H-D’s incidental, special or consequential damages 
(such as lost profits) in connection with a product delivery delay,” so long as “(1) Supplier’s de-
lay in delivering . . . is not the result of an intentional breach of this Agreement by Supplier and 
(2) upon recognizing that it will or probably will be unable to deliver . . . Supplier promptly in-
forms H-D and promptly and continuously uses its best efforts to deliver all late Products as 
quickly as possible.”) . 
86 As one OEM explained, even when there are “big problems,” his firm’s “philosophy is to 
work with them [the supplier] to fix the problem. Obviously if they can’t fix it over some period 
of time or it continues to be one that comes back. Then the partnership we thought we had, we 
don’t have anymore so we have to find another option.” NOE Respondent. 
87 Rooney & Vanden Heuvel (2004). 
88 Rooney & Vanden Heuvel (2004). Supplier Qualification questionnaires used during the 
supplier qualification process sometimes ask whether the supplier has established root cause 
analysis procedures. See, e.g., AAF International Supplier Questionnaire, Rev. 6/00, 
http://www.aaflatinoamerica.com/aafintl/supplier%20questionnaire%20pdf.ashx.pdf. In addi-
tion, some buyers reserve the right to be present during and participate in the conduct of the root 
cause analysis. See, e.g., Carlisle (2013, 22). 
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the parties’ relationship. They also make it possible for these contract provisions 
to condition on information that in their absence would not be observable and 
would only be verifiable through the filing of a lawsuit and the conduct of civil 
discovery. As a consequence, these provisions both expand the range of com-
mitments that can be extra-legally enforced and significantly reduce the likeli-
hood of a buyer filing suit or terminating a supplier based only on his best guess 
of what civil discovery would reveal.89 Together with buyers’ inclination to assist 
suppliers in solving production problems before sanctioning them, these provi-
sions add a measure of stability to these contracting relationships. 
The contract administration mechanisms described here are very effective in 
creating and sustaining cooperation; yet they require suppliers to disclose a great 
deal of information and place few constraints on buyers. As a consequence, even 
after contract provisions and contract administration mechanisms have done 
their work, buyers remain able to take advantage of suppliers once contractual 
relationships have begun. Among other things, they can press for costly changes 
to production processes, demand price reductions (other than those that are re-
quired or contemplated as part of the contract),90 and/or deviate from the ex-
pected order quantity. In addition, as discussed further below, as these relation-
ships move from make-to-spec to more complex relationships where suppliers 
take responsibility for design, co-design or aspects of sub-assembly, numerous 
other risks either emerge or become more salient, leaving suppliers (and in cer-
tain circumstances buyers) quite vulnerable.  
Given that suppliers are aware of the buyers’ opportunity to engage in hold-
up or other types of opportunism, buyers who do not intend to behave oppor-
tunistically would be better off if they could credibly bind themselves not to do 
so. One way that buyers attempt to limit the price they pay for the hold-up risk 
that cannot be eliminated by contract is to limit the amount of the harm they can 
inflict on a supplier. This in turn strengthens the supplier’s ability to resist the 																																																								
89 The provisions are necessary because even in contexts where it is likely to be in the suppli-
er’s interest to reveal this information, in the absence of these provisions the information would 
likely remain private. The individual employee who would have to release the information as 
well as the lawyer who would likely have to sign off on its release would face tremendous per-
sonal “second guess risk” from authorizing the release of this information, and therefore would 
be unlikely to do so. However, when these types of provisions are included they remove the se-
cond guess risk associated with revealing the information. For a comprehensive discussion of the 
ways that second guess risk affects lawyers, see E. Bernstein (2001). 
90 OEMs expect suppliers to cut costs each year. Some MSAs state the percentage reduction 
expected, others are silent. 
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buyer’s opportunistic demands. Buyers do this by refusing to contract if the 
amount they anticipate wanting to purchase is more than 20%-30% of the suppli-
er’s revenue.91 As a purchasing manager of a large medical machine OEM ex-
plained, her firm sometimes experienced large changes in the downstream de-
mand for its products and wanted to be able to vary its buy when this occurred 
or when one of their suppliers got a lower scorecard rating.92 However, the firm 
wanted to be able to do this without causing its suppliers severe financial harm 
or pushing them into bankruptcy.93 Doing either of these things would likely 
damage the buyer‘s reputation, make its other suppliers less likely to make rela-
tionship-specific investments, and force the buyer to bear the cost of switching to 
another supplier when demand increased. Indeed, a major benefit to OEMs of 
outsourcing is the ability to shift part of the risk of downstream changes in prod-
uct demand to their suppliers. In some contexts, suppliers may be better able to 
bear this risk than an internal firm division that produces only for intra-firm con-
sumption. The cost to a supplier of redeploying manufacturing assets to another 
purpose is likely to be less than the cost to an internal division of a firm of doing 
so. Unlike a supplier, an internal division would lack contacts with other pur-
chasers and would not have a developed sales infrastructure. 
Buyers obtain additional governance benefits from keeping their buy under 
20%. First, it strengthens the credibility of the buyer’s threat to either reduce its 
buy or terminate a particular supplier due to low scorecard ratings. Second, 
when buyers keep the buy percentage low, the supplier’s threat to exit the rela-																																																								
91 For the twelve OEMs in the NOE Study, information about the percentage of their largest 
suppliers’ revenue that their contracts amounted to was available for eight of them. For the com-
panies that follow, the percentage of the three publicly traded suppliers with the largest percent-
age of revenue related to the OEM contract is given in parenthesis: Navistar (33%, 16%, 6.2%); 
Arvin Meritor (99.11%, 16%, 1.2%); Ingersoll-Rand (10.5%, 5.1%, 3.1%); John Deere Horicon (14%, 
13%, 6.2%); Harley Davidson (12%, 2.2%, 1.58%); Osh-Kosh (8%, 4.4%); Kohler (24.08, 10%); CNH 
(.15%, .10%). Whitford (2006). These measure look only at the percentage of output of tier-one 
suppliers. They do not capture any larger dependency that a tier-two approved supplier may 
have by virtue of supplying more than one of a particular buyer’s tier-one suppliers. 
92 Interview with Supply Chain VP from a Large Health Care Machine Company (July 2013). 
93 One large OEM confirmed that they wanted their suppliers to sell to many others so that 
“they will remain healthy,” even when demand goes down. It explained that if a supplier offered 
to deal exclusively with them they would say “that is a bad idea. We would like to be a substan-
tial customer to you, but we don’t want you to be dependent on us.” NOE Respondent. Similarly, 
another OEM when asked whether he wanted his suppliers to diversify their customer base said, 
“Yes from a technology standpoint, from a supplier health standpoint . . . our goal is to be with 
the best suppliers in terms of quality and tech, we encourage our suppliers to work with others, 
we have suppliers that work with our competitors, but we manage it.” NOE Respondent. 
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tionship if the buyer behaves opportunistically is more credible, which in turn 
creates an incentive for the buyer not to misbehave. 
Explaining this practice, one procurement manager said that she wanted to be 
able to give her “supplier a giant nudge or kick in the pants,” but did not want 
the power to “be able to hit him with a hammer,”94 because at the end of the day, 
given how fast word of bad actions gets around, doing so would likely jeopard-
ize her relationships with her other suppliers. And, as a manager at a large sup-
plier explained, the OEMs wanted to shy away from deals that would make them 
appear “accountable”95 for the success or failure of a supplier’s business. Never-
theless, even when the buy percentage is kept low, additional constraints on 
buyer behavior are needed. As discussed further in Part IV below network gov-
ernance also plays an important role in achieving this. 
3. Conclusion 
In sum, buyers and suppliers have created an array of contract governance 
mechanisms that enable them to create highly cooperative contracting relation-
ships for goods made to the buyer’s specification. However, these mechanisms, 
standing alone, will be much less effective in maintaining cooperation when 
transactors enter into more complex undertakings such as those involving joint 
or supplier-led innovation. They will also be largely ineffective in enabling new 
transacting partners to engage in these types of undertakings at the outset of 
their contracting relationships.96 In transactions involving prospective innovation, 																																																								
94 This company also asks its suppliers to “give the names of your most important COMPA-
NYs for reference, including percentage of your sales to them,” and to opine on “what would be 
the mutual dependence that you perceive to be acceptable in a business relationship with Com-
pany.” Quality Management System, Supplier Information Form from Large Company (confi-
dential). 
95 Interview with Supply Chain VP from a Large Health Care Machine Company (July 2013). 
96 Three leading contract theorists, however, have suggested that contracts can endogenously 
create trust-based social capital from scratch, even in contexts in which the initial transaction be-
tween the firms is a complex agreement involving innovation that has important non-
contractable elements. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott (2010); Gilson, Sabel & Scott (2009); and Gilson, 
Sabel & Scott (2012). These authors look with great care at the language of ten “prototype” 
agreements and conclude that “parties today often treat trust as endogenous, as an object of con-
tracting rather than as a precondition . . .[and] write contracts in which they manifestly intend to 
establish a deeply collaborative relation, where little or none existed before.” Gilson, Sabel & Scott 
(2010, 1404). They identify two types of contract provisions that they view as providing the 
agreement’s most important contract governance mechanisms. First are provisions that are de-
signed to operationalize a “commitment to an ongoing mutual exchange of information designed 
to determine if a project is feasible, and if so, how to best implement the parties’ joint objectives.” 
Gilson, Sabel & Scott (2010, 1403). Second are “contract referee mechanism[s]” that require una-
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nimity for key decisions and require that disputes be referred up the chain of command if they 
cannot be resolved at lower levels (1403).   
However, a closer look at the contracting relationships surrounding the ten prototype con-
tracts reveals that pre-existing relational social capital between the transactors and/or structural 
social capital (that is, the network position of the firms) was present in all but one of these con-
tracting relationships and may therefore, as the theory discussed in the text suggests, also have 
played an under-appreciated role in the governance of these agreements and in transactors’ will-
ingness to have entered into them. 
Three contracts involved companies who had been doing business with one another long be-
fore the studied transaction, giving sufficient time for relationship-specific social capital to have 
developed. Prior to the Phoenix Technologies Ltd. & Intel Corp. Supply Contract, supra note 80, the 
parties had been co-developing products since at least 1988, see, Ed Scannell, “Phoenix Ships 
MCA-Compatible BIOS,” InfoWorld (Aug. 1, 1988). They also had strong connections to common 
customers as both supplied the same makers of generic personal computers, see Michael W. Mil-
ler, “IBM PC Clones Multiply Amid Price Battles,” Wall St. Journal, (June 17, 1986). Moreover, on 
the day this agreement was signed, Intel purchased 11 million dollars of Phoenix Stock, thereby 
introducing an additional and potentially important governance mechanism into the mix. See 
Phoenix Technologies Ltd. & Intel Corp, Common Stock and Warrant Purchase Agreement, (Dec. 18, 
1995). Similarly, the parties to the Allstate Insurance Co. & Acxiom Corp., Data Management Out-
sourcing Agreement (March 19, 1999), had been dealing with one another for at least six years prior 
to this contract. See Funding Universe, Acxiom Corporation History, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/acxiom-corporation-history/. And, prior 
to the John Deere & Co. & Stanadyne Corp., Long Term Agreement (Deere and Stanadyne 2001), 
which these authors suggested “help[ed] to establish and maintain a long-term supply arrange-
ment,“ (Gilson, Sabel & Scott 2009, 458), it is important to note, especially for the purpose of un-
derstanding contract governance, that the transactors had been doing business for at least 50 
years. See American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Rotary Distributor Fuel Injection Pump: Na-
tional Historic Engineering Landmark (April 1988), https://www.asme.org/getmedia/488b1889-
a13e-4c03-9bee-5f33d309fbba/131-Diesel-Fuel-Injection-Pump.aspx at 3. Moreover, the extent to 
which innovation was contemplated as part of this particular contract as opposed to in the con-
text of the parties’ contracting relationship writ large, is unclear given that the preamble to this 
contract stated that “[t]he scope of this agreement covers current products purchased from Sta-
nadyne Corporation. The products in-scope are the current DB rotary mechanical products, fuel 
filtration products, standard and RSN pencil injection nozzles, DE10 pumps and the Series 250 
Fuel Injection system” (Deere and Stanadyne Agreement, supra note 15 at 2). 
 Another three contracts took place between a buyer and an entity it had recently spun off, 
again suggesting that pre-contractual relationship-specific social capital was present. For back-
ground on the Apple Computer, Inc. & SCI Systems Inc., Fountain Manufacturing Agreement (May 31, 
1996), see New York Times, “Apple Agrees to Sell a Big Macintosh Plant,” (April 5, 1996); For 
background on the American Axle & Manufacturing Inc. & General Motors Co., Component Supply 
Agreement (June 5, 1998), see Joseph P. Ritz, “New Firm Offers to Buy GM Saginaw Plants Facili-
ties in Buffalo, Tonawanda, St. Catharine’s Affected; UAW Officials Angry,” The Buffalo News, 
at A1 (Sept. 10, 1993) (six former GM employees sat on the American Axle board of directors); 
and, finally, for background on the Boeing Co. & Spirit Aero Systems Inc., General Terms Agreement, 
(June 30, 2006), see Boeing Company 2005 Annual Report, 
http://investors.boeing.com/investors/financial-reports/default.aspx at 28. 
Two of the contracts were biotech alliances. As discussed in the text, infra text accompanying 
notes 125-133, the structure and governance of these types of agreements is strongly affected by 
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the parties might not have a clear idea of what is to be produced, how to manu-
facture it, or how to assess whether the finished part meets their overall expecta-
tions. As a result, there will be fewer if any metrics they can use to objectively 
assess one another’s performance, thereby increasing the risk of misunderstand-
ing, conflict and relationship breakdown. Yet the very governance frameworks 
that cannot themselves govern these more complex deals can, when implement-
ed over time in a particular contracting relationship, create the conditions in 
which they can thrive. As discussed further below, these frameworks can facili-
tate the creation of trust-based relational social capital that, in combination with 
the force of network governance, can create the conditions that make it more 
likely that buyers and suppliers will be able to more readily identify and more 
successfully bond these types of increasingly complex and innovative value-
creating undertakings. 
 
III. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
																																																																																																																																																																					
another sort of social capital, namely structural social capital, see infra text accompanying note 8, 
that has been demonstrated to be a potent governance force in biotech transactions. However, 
inter-personal social capital was also present in both of these transactions. In the Pharmacopeia & 
Bristol-Myers Squib, Collaboration and Licensing Agreement (Nov. 26, 1997), the Director of Biology 
at Pharmocopeia had spent the previous seven years at Bristol-Myers as a high-ranking scientist. 
See Sue Rodney, "Pharmacopeia, Inc. Announces Senior Management Appointments," PR 
Newswire, (Nov. 01, 1996). http://search.proquest.com/docview/450067348?accountid=14657. 
In the Warner-Lambert Co. & Ligand Pharmaceuticals Inc., Research, Development and License Agree-
ment (Sept 1, 1999), two members of Ligand’s board of directors had previously held high-
ranking executive positions at Parke-Davis, a Warner subsidiary and the division responsible for 
administering this agreement. In addition, Ligand had done business in the past with Parke-
Davis before it was taken over by Warner and as part of this transaction it purchased $2.5 Million 
in Ligand stock. The LA Times, Ligand, Warner in Research Collaboration, (Sept. 2, 1999), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/02/business/fi-5903. 
 The remaining co-development contract, the Nanosys, Inc. & Matsushita Electric Works, 
Ltd., Development Agreement (Nov. 18, 2002), dealt with nano-technology. It involved a business 
strategy on the part of the R&D-centered company Nanosys that could not work without enter-
ing into a significant number of strategic alliances with large partners who could produce and 
market products using their technology. The need to partner with these large firms (some of 
whom transacted with one another and whose employees often moved from firm to firm) situat-
ed the transaction in a network of firms that further reduced the likelihood that Nanosys would 
intentionally breach the contract they entered into with their first large partner, Matsushita Elec-
tric Works. 
Finally, the remaining contract did not involve any co-development; it was merely a sale of an 
airplane to an end user. See AVSA S.A.R.L. & New Air Corp., Airbus A320 Purchase Agreement (Apr. 
20, 1999).  
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1. Introduction 
The governance frameworks created by MSAs and the contract administration 
mechanisms used to implement them promote the growth of trust-based rela-
tionship-specific social capital in three important ways. First, as discussed above, 
they create conditions that support the emergence of repeat dealing relationships 
which in turn grow relational capital that is valuable to firms.97 Second, these 
frameworks facilitate the types of investments, norms and interactions that are 
commonly associated with the emergence of trust—defined as “the expectation 
that both actors will behave in a mutually acceptable manner, including an ex-
pectation that neither party will exploit the other’s vulnerabilities.”98 And third, 																																																								
97 For sources documenting this effect, see papers cited in Elfenbein & Zengler (2014). 
98 Schilke & Cook (2015, 277). There is another prominent definition of trust in the social capi-
tal literature that if used to understand commercial contracting would be problematic. As a lead-
ing social capital theorist explained ”trust is a relationship with someone (or something if the ob-
ject of trust is a group, organization, or social category) in which contractual terms are incom-
pletely specified. The more unspecified, taken-for-granted the terms, the more that trust is in-
volved.” Burt (2005, 93). However, there are reasons to question the suggestion that a more com-
plex or detailed contract is an indication of a less trusting relationship and the implicit assump-
tion that the terms specified in a written agreement will necessarily be complied with through the 
force or shadow effect of the law. 
  First, a detailed contract may be the outcome of a negotiation process that was deliberately 
structured to build trust-based social capital. In these settings, a longer contract (if it results from 
these trust-building activities) may indicate more rather than less trust. Indeed, lawyers negotiat-
ing information technology outsourcing contracts have developed a carefully structured and iter-
ated negotiating process that typically lasts six months to a year and artfully combines most of 
the elements identified by social capital theorists as contributing to the accumulation of trust. By 
the time the contract is ready for signature, the parties have learned about one another’s business 
culture and had an opportunity to see if their corporate cultures are compatible (a process some-
times referred to as mutual value discovery); have been faced with working through a series of 
increasingly difficult issues involving both concrete problems and judgment calls; and have de-
veloped an ethos of transparency in their interactions—interactions that are structured to include 
not only lawyers and executives, but also, after the initial negotiating sessions, the members of 
the business teams that will implement the contract. At the conclusion of the negotiations, care is 
taken to emphasize that “trust” is central to the transaction, but that careful writings are also 
needed to memorialize understandings in case either party experiences a change in key personnel. 
(Interview with Outsourcing Lawyer, Mar. 2014). See Information Services Group, IT Infrastruc-
ture Outsourcing Helps Shell Lower Cost, Drive Increased Efficiency (2013) (providing an example of 
an IT outsourcing contract where a similar mutual negotiation/value discovery process was used 
to negotiate and structure a deal). 
 Second, when dealing with a trusted contracting partner, it is easier to access the operational 
benefits of clarity and specificity (benefits that arise both within and across the contracting firms) 
without the downside risk of inflexibility that is often associated with detailed provisions. If you 
trust your partner to be flexible in contexts where implementing precise provisions does not 
make business sense, you are more likely to use precise terms. Third, when lawyers draft con-
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many aspects of these frameworks memorialize contract administration routines 
and firm policies that are similar to those that have been shown to increase or-
ganization-to-organization trust in relationships between automakers and their 
suppliers.  
A. The Effect of Prior Dealings on Current Dealings 
The importance and impact of prior dealings on buyers’ decision-making 
about whom to deal with and on what terms, has been empirically established in 
the industrial procurement context; it has been shown to be important even in 
transactions involving almost no uncertainty or relationship-specific investment.  																																																																																																																																																																					
tracts, they rarely start from a blank slate. Rather, they begin with a template, and adapt it to the 
individual transaction. Detail that is not necessary, but also not harmful, tends to remain in these 
agreements. This weakens the connection between detail and trust that would be more likely to 
exist if contracts (as the sociological and organizational behavior literatures seem to assume) were 
drafted anew for each transaction and included only those provisions the parties themselves 
viewed as necessary. Moreover, even if the contracts were drafted anew, the lawyers would insist 
on the inclusion of provisions that would be unnecessary from the parties’ private (and perhaps 
trust-based) calculus, simply because lawyers would likely want to avoid second guess risk. See 
E. Bernstein (2001). Fourth, clear contracts can also support trust-based relationalism by provid-
ing focal points that support norms of reciprocity. For reciprocity norms to function properly, the 
transactors need to have at least a rough mental account of who is the giver and who is the taker. 
See Hart (2008). When these mental accounts become unbalanced, or transactors’ perceptions of 
their balance fall out of alignment, transaction breakdown is more likely to occur. Recognizing 
this dynamic suggests that there is no necessary connection between contract detail and trust. 
Fifth, transactors who have dealt with one another on a repeat basis over a long period of time 
might also choose to include more detailed descriptions of the desired performance, even if their 
trust in one another were either increasing or remaining constant. The managers who negotiate 
the detailed provisions in scope of work and service level agreements might (if they are good 
agents) memorialize in writing the things they learned about one another’s expectations, needs, 
and operations, for two reasons. First, to reduce the interruptions caused by changes in person-
nel—in which case the length of the contract might be an indication of the importance of their 
tacit understandings. And, second, to ensure that accurate information about the deal flows 
through both their own and their partner’s hierarchy of operations in a consistent way. In addi-
tion, at the outset of the relationship, the employee who set up the deal (the “broker,” see note 
124 infra) might want to keep its terms vague, so that he remains indispensable to the administra-
tion of the deal and therefore better able to capture the individual returns associated with broker-
age. Over time, however, he will want to find new opportunities to broker, so he would be ex-
pected to be more willing to specify the operational aspects of the deals he helped to create. See, 
e.g., Argyres, Bercovitz, & Mayer (2007) (demonstrating in the context of a long-term supply con-
tract in the electronics industry that the Statements of Work became more detailed over time and 
came to reflect what the parties learned from one another). Finally, the assumption that specified 
provisions will be complied with due to the force of the law is simply false. The mere fact that 
something is specified in a contract, even completely specified, does not mean that it will be done, 
unless there is some other force motivating performance, like reputation, morality, or coercion of 
other sorts.  
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The most carefully conducted study that looked at the effect of prior dealing 
on partner selection and transaction price, examined the reverse auctions con-
ducted by the procurement department of a large mid-western industrial firm 
(Elfenbein & Zenger 2014). In advance of the bidding, all auction participants 
were prequalified as being able to supply the good in question at the desired 
quality level. The goods were primarily “commodity parts that can be well speci-
fied in a contract.”99 After bidding closed, corporate procurement managers 
chose the winning bid in consultation with “officers and divisional staff” (who 
had in turn consulted plant managers). This process was designed to reduce “the 
scope for private benefits or friendship ties to influence these outcomes.”100 As 
the authors explained, the “collaborative nature of the selection process, trans-
parency of alternatives and decisions, and organizational norms requiring care-
ful justification of supplier choice all worked together to limit the influence of 
private benefits or personal affinity on partner selection” (Elfenbein & Zenger 
2014, 228). 
The study found that “the value created by past exchange is economically 
meaningful” (Elfenbein & Zenger 2014, 228). In particular, the authors’ estimates 
indicate that increasing relationship length from the mean in the sample (roughly 
seven months) to one standard deviation above the mean (roughly 30 months) 
“is associated with an increase in willingness to pay of 8.5% (95% confidence in-
terval: . . . 5.2-14.9%).”101 It also found that the greater the risk of ex-post ex-
change hazards or the more complex the goods, the greater was the effect of past 
dealing on the premium the buyer was willing to pay. More broadly, the authors 																																																								
 
100 Elfenbein & Zenger (2014, 223) (noting that this institutional feature provides “additional 
confidence that the results . . . [of the study] reflect the relationship’s true economic value to the 
firm.”). 
For a study that also found a large effect of prior transactions on willingness to transact again 
in the context of strategic alliances, see Gulati & Gargiulo (1999, 1453–54) (drawing on “longitu-
dinal data on strategic alliances in a sample of American, European, and Japanese organizations 
in three industries over a 20-year period,” and demonstrating that “the probability of a new alli-
ance between specific organizations increases with their prior mutual alliance, common third par-
ties, and joint centrality in an alliance network.”). 
101  Elfenbein & Zenger (2014, 237). Similarly, a European-Israeli Mechanical Engi-
neer/Businessman in the specialty machine business, a context where the functional abilities of 
the machine to be produced can be specified, but what is to be produced cannot be described, 
reported that the companies he has dealt with in the past are willing to pay him at least a 15% 
premium over the lowest bidder, due to the quality of his past performance (Interview, Sept. 
2014). 
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concluded that the study confirmed the “consensus across a wide range of litera-
ture . . . that continued and repeated exchange generates a valuable asset that is 
both ‘created and leveraged through relationships’ that provides assurances 
against the threat of ex-post opportunism, and that facilitates adaptation and 
problem solving.”102 
B. Trust-based Relational Social Capital 
The social capital literature identifies a number of different aspects of ex-
change relationships that create the conditions under which interpersonal trust is 
most likely to arise. These include: the exchange of information;103 the formation 
of personal ties among the firms’ employees (and their associated character as-
sessments and loyalties);104 the making of reciprocal relationship-specific invest-
ments;105 the acquisition of experience in successful problem solving;106 and the 																																																								
102 Elfenbein & Zenger (2014, 224) (internal citation omitted). Another study that explores the 
connection between repeat dealing, trust, and transaction terms is Gulati (1995a, 85). Drawing on 
a study of strategic alliances “formed between 1970 and 1989 in the biopharmaceutical, new ma-
terials and automotive economic sectors by American, European and Japanese firms,” the paper 
explores the use of equity in strategic alliances. It finds “strong evidence that repeated alliances 
between two partners are less likely than other alliances to be organized using equity,” a finding 
that it attributes to the “role of inter-firm trust that emerges from repeat alliances between the 
same partners.” However, this conclusion should be viewed with caution. As the paper itself 
points out, while interview evidence supports the conclusion that trust explains the decreased 
likelihood of taking an equity stake in repeat transactions, the quantitative empirics presented 
cannot rule out the possibility that this is due simply to the fact that “two firms will prefer a non-
equity alliance only when they already have an equity alliance . . . [because] once two firms share 
one hostage it obviates the need for additional hostages” (Gulati 1995a, 94). 
103 See Gulati & Gargiulo (1999, 1455) (“Beneath the formalities of contractual agreements, 
multiple informal interpersonal relationships emerge across organizational boundaries, which 
facilitate the active exchange of information and the production of trust that fosters inter-
organization cooperation.”).  
104 Gulati & Gargiulo (1999, 1445) (concluding based on extensive interviews among partici-
pants in strategic alliances that “personal relationships among key individuals have played a cru-
cial role in producing trust between organizations in Japanese industrial groups . . . and in con-
tractual relationships.”). 
105 Roden & Lawson (2014) (drawing on a survey of UK firms to demonstrate that when buy-
ers and suppliers make bilateral relationship-specific investments (adaptations), they create rela-
tional capital).  
106 See, e.g., Knoppen & Christiaanse (2007, 228-229) (presenting case studies of supply rela-
tionships in which ”partners admitted that trust had grown over the years, by living through 
good and bad times together,” and concluding that “the satisfactory resolution of negative 
themes or crises fostered trust,” and illustrating it with an example in which the parties’ contract-
ing relationship “substantially improve[d] through the occurrence of a severe quality problem.”). 
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emergence and observance of norms of reciprocal flexibility.107 Although social 
capital theorists differ in the emphasis they place on each of these potential 
sources of trust, the frameworks used in OEM-supplier relationships support all 
of the conditions enumerated above that are associated with trust creation. 
Information Exchange Suppliers provide buyers with a great deal of information as 
part of the supplier qualification process. They are also required to: share de-
tailed costing data when bidding on a part, provide quality control reports at 
regular intervals, permit the buyer to audit their books and records, and provide 
the buyer with timely information relevant to the operation of their production 
line. Buyers have few information disclosure obligations apart from a duty to 
provide non-binding rolling forecasts on a monthly or quarterly basis. However, 
the most important exchanges of information for the purposes of building trust 
may be the transfer of more tacit information108 that occurs when buyer and sup-
plier employees interact with one another in person.109 
Personal Ties These contracting frameworks encourage the formation of personal 
ties between the buyer and supplier’s employees in numerous ways. Among 
them are: the quarterly business review meetings where buyer and supplier 
management meet; the many social events and conventions buyers host for their 
suppliers; the interactions on the production floor required by quality manuals; 
and the interactions that take place when buyer employees visit supplier premis-
es to help implement process improvements or when suppliers’ engineers take 
up residence at the buyer’s offices to help with product design.110  
Reciprocal Relationship-Specific Investments OEM supplier relationships involve re-
ciprocal relationship-specific investments even before the parties enter into their 																																																								
107 See, e.g., Gulati (1995a, 92) (suggesting that through ongoing interactions firms learn about 
each other and develop trust “around norms of equity.”). 
108 See Gulati (1995a, 90 nn. 1) (defining tacit knowledge as “knowledge that . . .typically re-
sides in patterns of relationships, norms, information flows, ways of making decisions, and other 
organizational factors.”). 
109 However, it is important to note that it is not clear whether information sharing leads to 
trust or trust leads to information sharing, See Dyer & Chu (2003, 66) (“Trust . . . appears to have 
a mutually causal relationship with information sharing that also creates value in the exchange 
relationship.”). 
110 See infra text accompanying notes 148–153 (describing Harley’s Supplier Council and Resi-
dent Engineer Program). See also Cummins (2010, Sec. e(2) and K(7)) (describing the company’s 
Advance Product Quality Planning Process that “brings the supplier’s management, Cummins. 
Inc., plant management, engineering, purchasing and others together at different stages of the 
process.”). 
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first contract because participation in supplier qualification programs is costly to 
both the buyer and the supplier. These required investments continue into the 
early stages of the relationship. The buyer bears the cost of sending either outside 
consultants or its own development team into the supplier’s plant to help it im-
prove its operations. In turn, the supplier must bear the costs of making the 
changes in their plant and operating procedures that are needed to meet the re-
quirements set out in the buyer’s quality handbooks.111 
Problem Solving Buyers and suppliers are likely to acquire experience solving 
problems during the make-to-spec stage of their relationships. Although these 
transactions are generally cooperative, problems nevertheless arise and buyers’ 
needs change in ways that require contractual adjustments. Dealing with these 
problems gives the firm’s employees a chance to work through problems before 
they become overly complex, and enables them to gain familiarity with the or-
ganizational cultures of one another’s firms.   
Norms of Reciprocity Finally, a number of OEM practices encourage norms of rec-
iprocity that are commonly said to “begin[] with a starting mechanism, which 
may take the form of a gift or other acts of assistance.”112 These include: the 
teams of consultants and process engineers that OEMs often send to their suppli-
ers’ plants at their own expense;113 the classes offered by firms like Deere and 
CAT to help suppliers improve their operational abilities; the institutionalized 
supplier development programs like JDCrop114 that help suppliers improve their 
operations and develop cost-saving ideas; and the common practice of not im-
posing fines for subpar performance even when performance is clearly deficient. 
More generally, the clarity in these contracts makes them a good reference point 
around which norms of reciprocity are likely to grow (Hart 2008). 
																																																								
111 Reciprocal relationship-specific investments are also encouraged and required as part of 
tooling agreements. See Harley-Davidson (2003, “Tooling Management Module”) (“Harley-
Davidson highly recommends that the production supplier be integrated into the design process 
for new tooling. “). 
112 Dyer & Chu (2000, 264) (providing an overview of the writing in sociology and anthropol-
ogy that supports this view of how reciprocal norms are established.). 
113 Dyer & Chu (2000, 265) (finding that in transactions between automakers and their suppli-
ers “the greater the assistance provided by the buyer to the supplier, the greater the supplier’s 
trust in the buyer.”). 
114 For a description of one such program, see Stegner, Butterfield, & Evers (2015) (describing 
the program at John Deere). 
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Together, these aspects of the contracting frameworks used in procurement 
contracts, and the types of interactions they directly or indirectly encourage, cre-
ate the conditions under which social capital theorists suggest trust is most likely 
to emerge.  
Although the role of trust in OEM-supplier relationships has not been studied 
quantitatively, quantitative studies of automaker-supplier relationships have 
demonstrated the economic benefit of trust in that context.115 Moreover, the in-
terview-based study of Midwest OEMs116 and their suppliers suggests that trust-
based relationship-specific social capital plays an important role in work-a-day 
contractual behavior and influences firm decision-making in ways that likely af-
fect the value of these commercial relationships.  
Among the most important and consistent viewpoints expressed in the inter-
views were: interpersonal relationships make it easier to solve problems;117 trust 
leads suppliers to reveal more accurate costing information to buyers;118 buyers 
are more willing to share technological advances and do co-design with suppli-
ers they trust;119 suppliers were more willing to make relationship-specific in-
vestments when they trusted buyers;120 and suppliers actively seek reputation 																																																								
115 Dyer & Chu (2003, 63–64) (presenting the results of an empirical study of the effect of trust 
on transactions costs in transactions between U.S., Japanese and Korean automakers and their 
suppliers, which shows that “there is a strong correlation between automakers’ trustworthiness 
and profit performance.”).  
116 For a description of this data source, see Whitford (2006). 
117 One supplier noted that upon entering into a contracting relationship, it tried to “spread 
like a virus,” forming interpersonal relationships across all levels of the buyer’s operation, be-
cause having strong relationships across a buyer’s operations, including “manufacturing, engi-
neering, management to some extent, marketing . . . all over the place . . . helps us solve prob-
lems.” NOE Respondent. And an OEM explained that it was sometimes worthwhile to buy from 
a long-time partner even at a higher price because when you need a favor like a very fast turna-
round “they do it” and are willing to “jump through hoops” because they know you will be back. 
NOE Respondent.  
118 NOE Respondent. One supplier noted that it was the sole source of a product to a trustwor-
thy OEM that never bid out its designs and that they shared costing data and worked harder to 
improve products. The supplier attributed its willingness to share its data to its relationships not 
only with buyer’s procurement personnel but also with people throughout the buyer’s hierarchy, 
from the president to the production line. The supplier noted, however, that they would not 
share this type of information with another OEM who dual-sources the product and whom they 
do not really trust. NOE Respondent . 
119 See infra text accompanying note 163. 
120 See Rickert et al. (2000, 33-34) (discussing and quoting suppliers’ views of the connection 
between OEMs’ past behavior, trust, and their willingness to make relationship-specific invest-
ments). One supplier noted that they were willing to make relationship-specific investments to 
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information about buyers.121 These findings are consistent with suppliers’ widely 
held perception that turnover in buyer personnel was detrimental to the smooth 
functioning of relationships. Suppliers repeatedly noted that this turnover made 
them less likely to share accurate costing information and more reluctant to par-
ticipate in buyer-sponsored supplier development programs (Rickert et al. 2000). 
Although the trust and loyalty created by interpersonal social capital are often 
valuable,122 they may also be costly. Managers might favor certain suppliers out 
of feelings of friendship or loyalty, even when they are not the best supplier 
available. Friendship might also lead managers to soften the type of criticism of-
ten needed to improve production methods.123 However, firms have developed 
ways to detect and mitigate these costs. Supplier scorecards and the quarterly 
business reviews held to discuss them function as an intra-buyer firm mecha-
nism to counter any distortions introduced by personal loyalties between buyer 
and supplier representatives. The scorecards provide objective metrics on sup-
plier performance that are accessible to and regularly reviewed by higher-level 
managers who are not as personally involved in management of the particular 
relationship. They therefore limit the ability of a supply chain manager to hide 
supplier under-performance. In addition, if relational ties become problematic, 
																																																																																																																																																																					
get more business from John Deere but they were not willing to do so with the auto companies. It 
explained that the auto companies “talk partnership . . . but they could be out [of the relation-
ship] in a second, so we are very careful about the investments we make for their parts. We have 
learned anything can go.” NOE Respondent. 
121 NOE Respondent. One supplier who was considering working with Deere’s supplier de-
velopment program explained that before deciding whether to participate, he wanted to visit the 
plant of another local supplier that had been part of the program. He explained that, among other 
things, he really wanted to know if Deere in fact shared cost savings 50-50 as they claimed. 
122 See, e.g., Cousins & Menguc (2006, 615) (presenting a survey-based study of UK firms that 
found that when buyers attempted to socialize their suppliers through “supplier conferences, 
regular meetings (formal and informal), telephone conferences, and site visits,” there was “a 
strong direct relationship between the level of the supplier’s socialization and contractual con-
formance”); see also Dyer & Chu (2011, 31–32) (discussing quantitative studies of trust that 
demonstrate its economic value). 
123 Over time, long-standing relationships may be affected by the same type of group-think 
that can pervade an internal division of a firm. However, these risks are attenuated in the out-
sourcing context. The supplier will continue to interact with other buyers. These other buyers will 
learn things from other suppliers of the same or similar goods, thereby obviating the emergence 
of group-think across their supply relationships. Indeed, while individual firms have come up 
with internal structures that are designed to avoid group-think—such as Steve Jobs’s practice at 
Apple of having multiple teams working on the same general idea in isolated pods—the avoid-
ance or mitigation of group-think may be one of the major benefits of outsourcing. 
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supply chain managers can easily depersonalize exchanges by rotating their pur-
chasing staff. 
1. Inter-Organizational Trust 
 The contracting frameworks adopted by large OEMs may also play a role in cre-
ating inter-organizational trust. Studies of automaker-supplier relationships have 
shown that suppliers have more trust in firms that have standardized supplier 
qualification programs, clear rules about the conditions under which a firm wins 
business, well-run supplier development programs, and, perhaps most im-
portantly, consistent procurement attitudes and processes writ large (Dyer & 
Chu 2011). The many supplier handbooks, supplier development programs, ap-
proved material lists, standard sets of terms and conditions, and clearly defined 
and understood procurement practices adopted by firms like Deere and Harley 
may well play a similar role in helping these firms establish trusting relation-
ships with their suppliers. One purchasing manager, who praised Deere and 
Harley for their consistency in their supplier relations, explained that another 
OEM who was a subsidiary of a foreign corporation was viewed as being consid-
erably less trustworthy since it had a very different culture and did not operate 
in predictable ways. This observation closely paralleled the observation of one of 
the suppliers in the automaker study who explained that “we cannot trust U.S. 
automakers as much as Japanese automakers because whenever they bring in 
new management, we get a whole new set of procurement rules and policies. The 
rules of the game are constantly changing. With Japanese companies we don’t 
seem to have the same problems” (Dyer & Chu 2000, 277). 
In sum, the frameworks that support the creation of relational social capital 
are expensive to create and maintain. Nevertheless, buyers often opt for relation-
al governance even when an arms-length contract could adequately govern their 
deal. Relational capital increases flexibility, enables the parties to rely on recipro-
cal informal adjustments being made over time, and leads to the sharing of in-
formation that can greatly reduce production costs. Moreover, as discussed fur-
ther below, one reason firms opt for relational contracting is that many of the in-
teractions among employees that successfully build relational social capital also 
increase the likelihood that employees of both firms will be able to identify addi-
tional value-creating transactions between their firms—a benefit that may well 
justify even the very significant costs of relational governance. 
2. Brokerage (Seeing Value-Creating Opportunities) 
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The types of governance structures that OEMs use to facilitate cooperation 
and build inter-organizational trust and trust-based relational capital do far more 
than increase transactors’ perceptions of the likelihood of performance. They also 
create the conditions under which some employees of both firms are, over time, 
more likely to identify either additional value-creating transactions or cost-
reducing product, process, or materials changes.  
As the contracting relationship matures and the employees of both firms in-
teract through development programs, conferences, and the meetings held in the 
regular course of administering their contracts, some are likely to begin to trust 
one another. As this trust builds, employees of both firms become increasingly 
likely to share information. And, as they become better acquainted with one an-
other’s operations, culture, and specialized language they will be better able to 
appreciate the meaning and importance of this information.124 This exchange of 
both tacit and explicit information, in turn makes it more likely that the firm’s 
employees will be able to identify additional ways to create joint value—that is, 
to engage in what social capital theorists call “brokerage.” As these opportunities 
are identified, the length of the perceived shadow of future dealing between the 
transactors lengthens, which, in turn, makes it less likely that either will breach 
or behave opportunistically in their current dealings.  
John Deere’s supplier development philosophy implicitly recognizes the con-
nection between buyers slowly deepening their relational ties with suppliers and 
the prospect of value-creating brokerage. Deere strives to “mature its providers 
over time,” even those that initially provide “commodities,” or “generic” parts. It 
uses suppliers’ behavior in these early deals to decide whether it is worthwhile to 
deepen its relationship with them. If these relationships do not go well, they are 
terminated within a year. In contrast, “if things go well, trust accumulates be-
tween buyer and seller and they can enter into a deeper relationship that gener-
ates more value for both of them” (Moore et al. 2002, Appendix A, p. 128). In 
Deere’s view this “value flows from increasing data exchange and [using] joint 																																																								
124 See Burt (2005, 17) (“Opinions and behaviors within a group are often expressed in a local 
language, a dialect fraught with taken-for-granted assumptions shared within a group. The local 
language makes it possible for people in the group to exchange often-repeated data more quick-
ly . . . [yet] the more specialized the language within groups . . . the greater the difficulty in mov-
ing ideas between groups.”); Harley Davidson produces a list of Harley acronyms to assist its 
suppliers in understanding their communications with the company. See Harley-Davidson (2003, 
“Acronyms”). Of the 154 acronyms listed, 37 have Harley-specific meanings, 6 have more than 
one general meaning that can easily be confused with the Harley meaning and the rest are widely 
used and can be found in a simple Google search.  
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work to improve the performance and cost of products and processes” (128). It 
also has the advantage of “train[ing] providers in Deere’s culture, making it in-
creasingly easy for them to respond to Deere’s needs in a reliable way” (129), so 
that Deere will eventually be able to give them far broader responsibility within 
the contracting relationship, including responsibility for design and/or innova-
tion. 
More generally, the recognition that relational governance can increase the 
likelihood of value-creating brokerage suggests that contract provisions and con-
tract administration procedures that dictate how often buyer and supplier per-
sonnel at particular levels of the organization interact, together with the breadth 
of the confidentiality constraints each firm imposes on its employees vis-à-vis 
employees of its contracting partners, may be quite important to both the value 
of future deals and the governance of present deals.  
IV. STRUCTURAL SOCIAL CAPITAL: NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
Wholly apart from the type of relationship-specific social capital discussed 
above, which might build too slowly to be useful in many transactional con-
texts,125 there is another type of social capital, “structural social capital,” that de-
rives its value from the positions of a firm and its contracting partner in a rele-
vant network of firms. A network is simply a set of connections between indi-
viduals or between organizations (here, firms). These connections can arise from 
prior deals between firms or prior social and business connections between their 
employees. When these connections exist they “establish[] a link that lowers the 
costs (or raises the accuracy) of subsequent communication” (Robinson & Stuart 
2006, 243). These links enable firms in the network to convey ”privileged infor-
mation about one another to other network members . . . [thereby] affect[ing] a 
counter-party’s reputation among future business partners” (243). As a conse-
quence, when a transaction is embedded in a network, the hostage value of repu-																																																								
125 See Burt (2005, 94-97; 104-105) (suggesting that opportunities for brokerage are often identi-
fied before the trust needed to take advantage of them has developed). See also Vanpoucke, Ve-
reecke, & Boyer (2014, Table 2) (demonstrating through six longitudinal studies of contracting 
relationships that sufficient trust to support moving from the “exploratory” stage—that is, the 
make-to-spec stage where there is no expectation of long-term dealings—to the “expansion” 
stage which is “triggered by a high level of trust,” and involves some degree of integration be-
tween the parties, took from about four to fifteen years, and that an additional five or more years 
were needed for full knowledge sharing).	
However, in some contexts, even when this relationship-specific social capital is absent, con-
tracts can be adequately bonded by interorganizational trust which can grow relatively quickly. 
Dyer & Chu (2000, 275).  
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tation is much greater than when a transaction is between two firms with few, if 
any, connections to other firms in the relevant market (248 fig. 1). It is through its 
effects on the flow of information that structural social capital can function as a 
network-based contract governance mechanism. 
To understand the ways that network governance influences transactions, it is 
useful to look at its effect on contract compliance and governance writ large. It is 
also interesting to explore the way it interacts with contract-related decision 
making and contract provisions on a more micro level. As discussed further be-
low, structural social capital may be harnessed to achieve a variety of ends. Most 
notably, it can reduce the need for firms to employ costly governance mecha-
nisms and can make it possible for transactors to use (and reliably bond) contract 
provisions that condition on information that would not be either observable or 
verifiable to a court or other adjudicatory forum.  
1. Biotech Alliances and Network Governance in a Market Context 
The power of network governance has been most carefully documented in the 
context of biotechnology alliances. One study looked at over “38000 alliance 
transactions between pharmaceutical firms and biotechnology research firms,” a 
transaction type where “agreements are fraught with moral hazard, asymmetric 
information, and other contracting problems.”126 The network ties employed in 
the study were the “stock of past alliances” among the studied firms (243). It 
found that both firms’ positions in the relevant network of firms significantly af-
fected the size of the equity stake (which is generally regarded as a key govern-
ance mechanism in alliance transactions) that the large pharmaceutical company 
took in its alliance partner. 
There are two important dimensions of a firm’s position in a network.127 The 
first is centrality.128 Conceptually, a firm is said to be central in a network if it 
has ”a large number of connections to firms, which, in turn, are each linked to 
many other firms” (Robinson & Stuart 2006, 249). In theory, the more central a 
firm is, the more deeply embedded it is in the pattern of communication in the 
network, and the greater is its power to quickly and effectively spread the word 																																																								
126 Robinson & Stuart (2006, 243). For the mathematical definition of centrality used to quanti-
fy it in the study, see Robinson & Stuart (2006, 252).  
127 For an intuitive pictorial illustration of these two aspects of network position, centrality 
and proximity, see Robinson & Stuart (2006, 248 fig. 1).  
128 Robinson & Stuart (2006, 247) (“a property determined by the overall shape of the net-
work”). 
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if its alliance partner acts opportunistically.129 The biotech alliance study found 
that “when one of the counterparties is deeply embedded within [the network, 
that is, central to it,] the deals they consummate are less likely to involve equity 
participation and typically entail lower amounts of equity when equity is used” 
(269). 
 The other important dimension of two firms’ position in a network is their 
proximity to one another. Two firms are said to be more proximate “when fewer 
intermediaries separate two counterparties.”130 In theory, proximity should de-
crease the equity stake taken for two reasons. First, ”because more proximate 
[firms] have either transacted directly in the past or have engaged in transactions 
with an overlapping set of counterparties,” they have far more information about 
one “another’s reputation and abilities than do members of a more distant pair-
ing.”131 Second, proximity increases the ability of the large pharmaceutical firm 
to sanction the smaller biotechnology firm if it misbehaves. This effect arises be-
cause the biotechnology firms’ “set of current and past collaborators are its more 
likely [set of future] trading partners” (Robinson & Stuart 2006, 249). As a conse-
quence, proximity gives the large pharmaceutical firm a more credible threat to 
sanction any misbehavior on the part of the biotech firm,132 which should lead to 
a lower equity stake being taken. Consistent with these predictions, the study 
found that as “proximity increase[s], equity participation (measured by size and 
propensity) diminishes.”133 
More broadly, the study documents the ability of structural social capital to 
function as a contract governance device with the potential to sanction, and 																																																								
129 As Robinson and Stuart explain, “[t]he economic value of centrality lies in the ability of 
centrally positioned agents to reduce incentive conflicts after the contract has been initiated by 
threatening (implicitly) to sanction opportunistic behavior” (2006, 249). 
130 Robinson & Stuart (2006, 247) (emphasizing that “[p]roximity is a property of a pair of 
firms”). 
131 Robinson & Stuart (2006, 249). In this context, given the many non-contractable aspects of a 
deal, transactors are highly unlikely to deal with partners they view as affirmatively untrustwor-
thy at the outset. 
132 The centrality of the biotech firm may also affect incentives since “[c]entral firms tend to 
have widely known reputations and to be well regarded by other members of the network.” Be-
cause “sanctions are particularly costly for those with valuable reputations,” these more central 
firms have more potential future opportunities that they will lose if negative information about 
them flows through the network than do less central firms. Robinson & Stuart (2006, 250). 
133 Robinson & Stuart (2006, 242). Although the study confirmed that both centrality and prox-
imity affected the power of network governance, it is important to note that it found the effect of 
centrality was five times as large as the effect on proximity.  
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therefore to deter, opportunism. This suggests that if the lawyers structuring the-
se deals want to avoid the cost of using an equity stake as a governance mecha-
nism where it is unnecessary, they need to know more than the “bilateral trans-
action history of the firms in question.”134 In particular, they will need to know 
the pattern of past alliances and connections in the deal-relevant network be-
cause “opportunism is mitigated by a counterparty’s reputation among [and po-
sition in relation to] potential future contracting partners, not just through its 
reputation with preexisting partners” (Robinson & Stuart 2006, 244). 
The study also demonstrates that network governance can and does work, 
even in contexts where detailed information about transactors’ underlying be-
havior is not widely available.135 It can even be effective in contexts where the in-
formation that is available publicly—namely outcomes—is too noisy to convey 
useful information to putative contracting partners given the low probability of 
success in such ventures and the wide variety of reasons they fail.136 Indeed, one 																																																								
134 Robinson & Stuart (2006, 244). In other words, the type of transaction pictured in the bot-
tom lefthand box in the figure in note 7 supra.  
135 This was true of the firms in the biotech study, a context in which “the details of a[] [firm’s] 
conduct in its past alliance cannot be observed publicly” and “information about past behavior is 
transmitted across private information links.” Robinson & Stuart (2006, 246). In addition, the 
study found that both proximity and centrality were more powerful predictors in alliances be-
tween privately held firms about which less public information is available. This suggests that it 
was information carried by the network that influenced the structure of the alliance. 
136 Interview evidence from studies of strategic alliances in a variety of industries and high-
tech contracting contexts is consistent with the biotech study’s findings about the force of net-
work governance and the existence of the reputation-transmission channels it identified. This 
evidence suggests that managers routinely rely on network-provided information (including ag-
gregate assessments of their potential partner’s business reputation) and their potential partner’s 
position in the relevant network of firms when selecting alliance or contracting partners. As one 
manager explained, “In some cases . . . our [existing alliance] partner may refer us to another firm 
about whom we were unaware . . . An important aspect of this referral business is of course about 
vouching for the reliability of that firm. Thus, if one of our longstanding partners suggests one of 
their own partners as a good fit for our needs, we usually consider it very seriously." Gulati (1993, 
56). Interviews with managers also support the idea that reputation information not only flows 
through networks, but also travels quickly. As one manager of a high-tech firm explained, "If we 
were to have a major breakdown in our relationship with HiTech Computer, within thirty days 
that would be well known throughout the industry in New England." Larson (1992, 76). Similarly, 
Gulati (1993, 90) reports the comments of a senior manager at Cadence Technologies who implic-
itly revealed the interplay of reputation information and network position when he explained 
that: 
 We had included ODI in our final list based on its technological competence. But 
then we were interested in knowing more about their business integrity and sup-
port structure. Once we realized that they had prior relationships with IBM and 
Ericsson, with whom we also had prior technology partnerships, we called manag-
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of the main advantages of network-based governance and one of the key insights 
of the network literature is that the information that flows through networks 
need not be either directly observable to, or verifiable by, the recipient to have an 
impact on the way the recipient views the subject of the information.137 As a con-
sequence, the network can facilitate the imposition of non-legal sanctions for 
misbehavior on the basis of types of information that cannot be used by either 
the legal system or other types of adjudicatory fora to do so.138  																																																																																																																																																																					
ers within those two and had extensive conversations about ODI. It turned out that 
IBM had in fact earlier picked an ODI competitor, whom we were also considering, 
and subsequently reversed their decision and picked ODI. These factors were very 
important in our decision to pick ODI. 
Additional examples abound. 
137 Several leading contract theorists, see note 96 supra, have largely dismissed the role of net-
work governance in the context of biotech alliances. They explain that “[w]hile we recognize the 
role of reputation as one element of switching costs, we remain skeptical about the extent to 
which reputation can carry the weight [the Robinson and Stuart Biotechnology study] assign[s] to 
it. Most important, it is extremely difficult for third parties, however well connected, to observe 
the conduct of the parties. Suppose a venture fails. Given the very low likelihood of finding a 
successful drug, the most reasonable inference is that the outcome is the result of bad luck, not 
poor skills or bad faith.“ Gilson, Sabel & Scott (2009, nn. 123). This criticism, however, assumes 
that the network can only transmit information about the success or failure of the project. It does 
not fully appreciate the breadth of the information networks can convey (including information 
that is neither observable nor verifiable) about the transactors and their behavior. Indeed, this 
aspect of information transmission was taken into account by the authors of the biotech study, 
who recognized that it is because information across networks is sticky and variable that network 
position has such an important impact on contract governance (Robinson & Stuart 2006, 246–47). 
See also Gulati & Gargiulo (1999, 1445–46) (concluding, based on interview evidence and a quan-
titative study of alliance transactions that “the information that flows through the alliance net-
work is not only trustworthy, but also timely,” and noting that according to one manager “we 
and our prospective partner must know about each other’s needs and identify an opportunity for 
an alliance together in a timely manner . . . Our partners from past alliances are one of our most 
important sources of timely information about alliance opportunities out there, both with them 
and with other firms with whom they are acquainted.”). 
138 The observation that information will be conveyed through networks does not necessarily 
mean that all of the information will be accurate from an objective point of view or that it will 
have the same power to someone who hears it fourth hand as it would to someone who hears it 
second hand. In addition, as some types of information (in certain contexts) pass through social 
networks, their content is altered by peoples’ propensity to filter what they say according to 
standard rules of etiquette, rules that tend to slant opinions expressed by the speaker towards 
those thought to be held by the listener. As a consequence of this, information tends to “echo” 
and move towards extreme poles of trust and distrust. Although the importance of echo has been 
demonstrated within firms, how it might work in reference checks between firms that are cur-
rently dealing with one another is less clear and is likely, in any particular case, to be influenced 
by the amount of trust between the speaker and the listener, as well as the tone of their relation-
ship. See Burt (2005, Ch. 4). 
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A final important aspect of network governance is that its disciplining effect 
can extend to all of the commitments made in a contracting relationship, not just 
those whose violation would give the breached-against party a credible threat to 
sue. It can therefore create incentives for transactors to refrain from breaching 
“interior promises” and from taking opportunistic actions that while not serious 
enough to end the relationship, nevertheless impose harm on their contracting 
partner. For example, suppose that a supplier refused to permit a buyer’s repre-
sentative to conduct an unannounced factory inspection or audit that was au-
thorized by the MSA. The buyer would not have a credible threat to sue for dam-
ages. It would be unlikely to be able to prove a quantifiable harm from the 
breach and a missed inspection is unlikely to be significant enough to lead it to 
terminate the supplier. However, the buyer could, especially if this happened on 
several occasions, talk to other market participants about the supplier’s behavior. 
This type of information might make new partners more reluctant to contract 
with the supplier, or make its current partners worried about its plant’s opera-
tion, leading them to exercise their rights of inspection as well. In contexts like 
mid-west procurement, where suppliers understand that word of this type of be-
havior is likely to spread quickly and impact its relationships with other buyers, 
suppliers will be much less likely to engage in this behavior in the first place. In 
sum, the existence of the network serves to increase the reputational harm and 
nonlegal sanctions for misbehavior. It thereby broadens the type of misbehavior 
that can be policed through multilateral nonlegal sanctions. 
2. OEMs and Network Governance 
There are no quantitative studies exploring the effects of networks on contract 
structure or performance in the midwest OEM procurement context. However, 
the interview-based study of market participants and preliminary research ex-
ploring the contractual connections among firms in the relevant market suggests 
that network governance is likely to play a role in OEM supplier transactions. 
Figure 1 below is a sociogram of the contracting relationships between three 
OEM’s—Harley-Davidson, Ingersoll Rand, and John Deere—and their suppliers 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Network members do not need to completely trust network-circulated information for it to af-
fect their actions. Sometimes information that is not viewed as entirely trustworthy might put the 
recipient firm on notice that further inquiry is needed before dealing with the firm in question. 
This in turn will raise the cost of dealing with the gossiped-about firm and make it a less attrac-
tive contracting partner at the early screening stage. 
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(black lines) and the contracting relations among their suppliers (grey lines).139 
These relationships were used as a rough proxy for interpersonal relationships. 
The proxy seems reasonable (if crude) in light of the fact that these contracts tend 
to be relationally managed. For this reason, social relationships between the 
firms’ employees are likely to exist in all but the newest contracting relationships. 
Figure 1: Sociogram of the Connections between Deere, Harley, Ingersoll 
and their Suppliers (dark lines) and the Relationships among their Suppliers 
(light lines)140  
 
 
 
 
 
The tightly connected (dense) structure of the connections between firms in 
this market makes it likely that reputational information about them will flow 
easily through the market.141 In addition, even if the relevant information does 																																																								
139 These figures picture the largest suppliers, since they are required to make these transac-
tions public under the U.S. securities laws. Data was obtained from the site CSImarket.com. 
Ingersoll is in the middle because it is both an OEM and a supplier to other suppliers. 
140 The chart above is based on 165 suppliers. Preliminary results for a study looking at 6,624 
suppliers to these firms found them separated by 3.64 steps, again using geodesic distance as a 
measure of connectedness. 
141 In the language of social capital, this can be understood as a “closed network,” a group 
within which connections are so dense that information will circulate quickly and reputations 
will form. See Burt (2005, Ch. 3). 
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not diffuse on its own, any firm in this network (including the OEMs) that want-
ed to actively find out about any other firm would only have to go through an 
average of 2.1 firms to get it.142  
Given this network structure, if an OEM were to act opportunistically towards 
a supplier, word of its misbehavior would likely spread quickly and easily 
through the relevant supply base.143 This type of information, particularly if it 
comes from more than one source, has the potential to damage the OEM’s repu-
tation, leading to the usual repercussions. Misbehaving OEMs may be charged a 
higher price to reflect the perceived risk of dealing with them; their suppliers 
may be willing to make fewer (contractually unsecured) relationship-specific in-
vestments; they may find the supplier’s B team rather than its A team assigned to 
their account;144 and both current and future suppliers may demand additional 
costly protections in their formal contracts. As a consequence, the force of net-
work governance is likely to deter OEM opportunism and give these firms an in-
centive to treat their suppliers fairly. 
 The constraints imposed on OEMs by virtue of the network are of great value 
to suppliers because MSAs contain few safeguards (and even fewer effective 
safeguards) against OEM misbehavior.145 They are also valuable to OEMs be-																																																								
142 Calculated using UCINET software’s measure of “geodesic distance,” a measure of the av-
erage distance between any two nodes (firms) in the network. 
143 In this market, supplier employees switch firms quite often. Suppliers are therefore able to 
learn a great deal about the contracting behavior of both other suppliers and the OEMs by talking 
to their own employees. Interview with Senior Manager of OEM (Dec. 2015). OEMs are quite 
aware of the potential effects this movement of employees might have on their reputation. As 
counsel to an OEM explained, we know there is a “revolving door of salesmen at our suppliers,” 
and they bring their knowledge of how we treat them with them as they move from firm to firm. 
Interview with Counsel to OEM (Dec. 2015). 
144 For example, a study of the relationship between automotive OEMs and their tier-one sup-
pliers found that “[s]uppliers . . . provid[e] benefits to each OEM typically in proportion to the 
working relations [as measured by the study’s Working Relations Index] they are experiencing. . . 
the better the relations experienced, the greater the benefits provided.” See Planning Perspectives 
Inc. (2013). These benefits included having the supplier’s “A team” assigned to their firm as well 
as the advantages that flow from ”advanced technology, more supplier resources committed to 
their business and higher quality parts and components”). See Planning Perspectives, Inc. (2014). 
145 The interviews revealed that when a buyer takes advantage of a supplier, word gets out 
and suppliers become more reluctant to share innovations or costing information with those buy-
ers. For example, one supplier explained that when it comes up with a cost-cutting innovation, it 
shares the innovation immediately with X Co., but “would never take it to [Y Co.], never . . . we 
know what happens there,” i.e., the proprietary information will leak. NOE Respondent. And, as 
another supplier explained, while suppliers are very vulnerable to OEMs taking their ideas for 
product innovations and improvements and turning around and bidding out production, their 
ability to do this is tempered by the relationships the buyer’s and supplier’s employees have 
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cause they increase the credibility of their commitment to treat their suppliers 
fairly.  
It might seem counter-intuitive that large OEMs who typically have the option 
of buying what they need from many sources would care so much about their 
reputation with their supply base. However, even firms as powerful as Apple are 
deeply concerned about their reputation for treating suppliers fairly. Recently, 
when one of Apple’s suppliers filed for bankruptcy, the supplier’s Chief Operat-
ing Officer filed a declaration accusing Apple of using “contracts of adhesion” 
and systematically mistreating its suppliers by using “bait-and-switch” tactics 
(Squiller Declaration at Paragraphs 18 and 10, cited in Apple (2014). Apple re-
sponded to these accusations by seeking to put the declaration under seal. In its 
pleading Apple argued that “defamatory statements about the manner in which 
Apple treats its suppliers would make it more difficult for Apple to deal with its 
suppliers” (Apple 2014, Count 17, p. 56). 
The existence of the network pictured above is also likely to constrain the ac-
tions of suppliers. Buyers can easily reach out to either one another or their cur-
rent suppliers to learn about the reputations of putative suppliers.146 In addition, 
large OEMs deal with a number of the same suppliers. For example, the three 
OEMs in Figure 1 share 13 suppliers. Deere and Harley share an additional 10. 
Given the relatively small number of OEMs, suppliers realize if they misbehave 
toward one OEM this information could quickly and easily be shared with both 
their other OEM buyers and, perhaps, other putative contracting partners—
thereby costing it far more than the potential loss of one OEM’s business.  
In sum, the fact that these contracting relationships are embedded in a net-
work of highly interconnected firms constrains the actions of both buyers and 
suppliers. The network helps to ensure that transactors face multilateral reputa-
tion sanctions (and the costs and loss of business that entails) when they act im-																																																																																																																																																																					
formed, and “ultimately, you [the supplier] hope that you have the opportunity to call on those 
relationships to at least make sure that there's a level playing field when the purchasing decision 
is made. It doesn't always work that way. But for the time being, in my mind, it's the right way to 
do business.” NOE Respondent. In addition, OEMs are aware that suppliers talk among them-
selves and know this information will spread quickly. Interview with Senior Supply Chain Man-
ager at Large OEM (Apr. 15, 2014). 
146 Although the OEMs themselves do not have a particularly strong incentive to share infor-
mation about misbehaving suppliers (outside of the standard reference checks that are conducted 
as part of supplier qualification programs), the procurement managers whose performance (and 
with it their personal compensation) depends on choosing the right suppliers have an incentive 
to share accurate information about supplier performance with one another. 
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properly, rather than merely the loss of a single business partner. By increasing 
the expected cost of misbehavior to both transactors, the force of network gov-
ernance broadens the self-enforcing range of these contracts well beyond the 
range that purely bilateral forces could support.147  
3. Buyer-Created Local Networks: Leveraging Closure and Brokerage 
    Although market-based network governance is a potent force, some OEM 
buyers seek to strengthen their commitment to treat their suppliers well by tak-
ing steps to actively encourage the creation of strong interpersonal ties among 
the suppliers in their local network.148 For example, in the mid-1980’s, Harley-
Davidson began to actively encourage the creation of a network of interpersonal 
ties among its suppliers. To achieve this, it developed and funded a Supplier 
Council, consisting of “16 suppliers which, as a group, represent a cross section 																																																								
147 The processes and quality control standards imposed by OEMs are reasonably similar to 
one another, which creates a common understanding (within limits) across the industry about 
what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Although this homogeneity is not needed 
for network governance to be effective, its presence is likely to strengthen it. 
148 The now defunct Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) is another example of a company 
that facilitated the creation of a network among its contracting and alliance partners that enabled 
it to more credibly commit not to behave opportunistically towards them. DEC, which pursued a 
strategy of entering into strategic alliances with many small companies, held an annual confer-
ence where all of its alliance partners could meet and learn about one another. During these 
meetings, DEC’s partners often decided to enter into alliances with one another and used DEC 
managers as reference checks for capability and trustworthiness. These conferences increased 
business opportunities for DEC’s partners and created two types of network governance benefits 
for DEC itself. First, as additional network connections were created among DEC’s partners, the 
non-legal sanction each partner would suffer if they acted opportunistically toward DEC in-
creased. If DEC retaliated by spreading negative gossip about the partner’s behavior, it might 
destabilize the current alliances the partner had with other DEC-affiliated partners and reduce 
the business opportunities the partner could potentially take advantage of at the next DEC con-
vention. Second, by promoting the growth of a network among its suppliers (both a network of 
actual alliance transactions and a setting in which gossip could flow among its many alliance 
partners) DEC bound itself to post more of its reputation as a bond against its own misbehavior in 
its relationships with its alliance partners. This, in turn, made DEC a more attractive alliance 
partner. By creating and strengthening these interpersonal and inter-organizational ties among its 
alliance partners, DEC strengthened the effectiveness of this network-aided governance structure 
for its many strategic alliances (Gulati 1995b). The existence of this network suggests that a DEC 
lawyer who was trying to determine what types of formal governance mechanisms to include in 
an alliance agreement who did not pay attention to the network position of the particular partner 
might include governance provisions that were expensive and unnecessary, or fail to include 
governance mechanisms that, while costly, could nonetheless add value to the deal.  
Actively creating networks to bond both contractable and non-contractable aspects of deals 
and to increase the sanctions for misbehavior has also been accomplished through trade associa-
tions, see Bernstein (1992, 1996, 2001).		
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of Harley-Davidson’s supply base of more than 400 OEM Suppliers . . . [that] 
meets 4 times a year in conferences that last 2-3 days,” with each member con-
tacting nine to twelve other first tier suppliers to get their views about the com-
pany’s actions.149 Although the effort was motivated by the company’s desire to 
diffuse best practices and to create an “intimate relationship with [its] suppli-
ers,”150 it had the incidental effect creating a relatively closed network of strong 
ties among its key suppliers. Ties among the suppliers’ employees were also cre-
ated through Harley’s Resident Engineer Program. This program consisted of 
“an on-site residency for suppliers to participate in the development of new 
products,” in which “[f]ifty full-time resident . . . suppliers and 80 part time resi-
dents take part in new product design . . . this interaction takes place at the com-
pany’s Product Development Center . . . and brings together design, engineering 
and manufacturing and suppliers” (see Monczka et al. 2009). In addition, engi-
neers from important suppliers are invited to work at Harley’s product devel-
opment center on an as-needed basis. 
By embedding its relationships with key suppliers in a closed network,151 Har-
ley ensured that if it behaved badly, word of its misdeeds would quickly spread 
throughout its supply base.152 As a consequence, the existence of this local net-
work made it possible for Harley to, in effect, post its reputation as a bond, ena-
bling it to more credibly promise its suppliers that it would not behave oppor-
tunistically. The ability to make these credible commitments was particularly 
valuable to Harley, given that it needed its suppliers to make many Harley-
specific investments and was attempting to compete with larger-volume buyers 
for its suppliers’ loyalty and attention.153 
																																																								
149 See Fitzgerald (1996, 55). 
150 NOE Respondent. For example, one Harley supplier, when asked if he shared costing data 
and other information with Harley, replied that he would, explaining that “I think Harley Da-
vidson is pretty easy to deal with, I don’t have any issues, I think Harley is a good customer.” 
NOE Respondent. And as another supplier noted, Harley was not as ruthless as the auto compa-
nies in demanding price cuts and that his firm is “in it for the long haul with Harley, who is al-
lowing them both to make profits and they are pretty happy with them.” NOE Respondent. 
151 These examples are illustrations of the idea of network closure. See Burt (2005, Ch. 3) 
(providing an overview of the effects of network closure). 
152 See also Holstrom & Roberts (1998, 82) (suggesting that a similar function is played by 
Toyota’s Japanese supplier council and is one reason that Toyota organized such a council at its 
Kentucky plant). 
153 For an overview of Harley’s Supply Strategy, see Milligan & Carbone (2000).  
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 By creating so many personal ties and interactions among engineers from dif-
ferent firms, the Harley Resident Engineer Program might also, for reasons dis-
cussed more fully below, have encouraged innovation. As one engineer working 
on a power train project with engineers from 15 suppliers observed, “being to-
gether makes things dynamic . . . It is a huge advantage for the supplier to talk 
face-to-face, get in on the prototype stage” (Milligan & Carbone 2000, 63). 
4. Conclusion  
Recognizing the ways that social and business networks transmit information 
(both tacit and explicit), and the ways that transactors can actively create net-
work ties to bond obligations contracts cannot, suggests that the value of a con-
tractual relationship cannot be properly understood by looking only at the con-
tracting parties themselves (the transactional dyad). Rather, the network struc-
ture of the relevant market in which the transaction is embedded and the local 
(ego) networks around each of the transactors may affect the choice of a contract-
ing partner, the scope of the discretion given to one’s partner, the type and 
amount of information exchanged, the likelihood (discussed further below) that 
the supplier will be able to innovate on the buyer’s behalf (along with whether 
effective contracts for innovation can be devised) and the types of governance 
provisions needed. The reason is simple: the network structure of a market, the 
firms’ places in that structure, and the local network around each firm all affect 
the self-enforcing range of the parties’ contractual commitments—potentially 
broadening it well beyond the bilaterally generated self-enforcing range as tradi-
tionally defined—as well as the types of value-creating opportunities that the 
parties are likely to identify in the future.154  
More broadly, once it is recognized that networks have the power to credibly 
(though not absolutely) transmit information that is neither observable nor veri-
fiable, and to at least partially bond obligations whose violation is not serious 
enough to lead to termination of an otherwise valuable contracting relationships, 
it becomes clear that unless lawyers pay attention to the network context of the 
agreements they draft,155 they will not be able to properly evaluate the value of 
the transactions their contracts consummate, nor will they be able to structure 
those contracts to take advantage of the powerful social forces that can make 
them more effective contract governance instruments.  																																																								
154 Klein & Leffler (1981). 
155 Robinson & Stuart (2006, 244); see also supra text accompanying notes 126-135.  
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V. INNOVATION AND THE MAKE-OR-BUY DECISION 
OEM buyers are increasingly interested in dealing with suppliers who can in-
novate either jointly or on their behalf. They prefer suppliers who are able to 
provide both the goods they want today and the goods (some known and some 
unknown) that they will want in the future. A 2014 survey of procurement exec-
utives found that “tapping supplier innovation . . . is the second-highest [pro-
curement] priority, and includes actively attracting and developing the most in-
novative suppliers to help generate new ideas.”156 And, a study of the most in-
novative firms in Europe found that “innovation leaders better understand the 
power of their supply base and work collaboratively to involve the right suppli-
ers as early as possible in the innovation process,” finding that 90% of the most 
innovative companies (as compared to 54% of other companies) had well-
developed and highly structured processes for early supplier involvement in in-
novation.157  
The importance buyers attach to the prospect of future supplier-involved in-
novation is also reflected in supplier qualification questionnaires that require pu-
tative suppliers to disclose their R & D expenditures.158 It is also suggested by the 
many recent efforts of international organizations,159 buyers, and private consult-
ing firms to develop new key performance indicators to quantify suppliers’ pro-
pensity to innovate (ATKearney 2014). As one OEM executive explained, “with 
the partners we’ve had, that we have developed . . . we not only look at what 
they have today, we think [about whether] we can develop a product in the fu-																																																								
156 Connaughton & Sawchuck (2014, 3) (reporting that 69% of buyer-respondents viewed at-
tracting innovative suppliers as being of “critical” or “high” importance); see also Quinn (2000) 
(giving multiple examples, but not systematic data, to support the author’s view that outsourcing 
innovation has become profitable, widespread and in some contexts necessary for modern firms 
to compete).  
157 ATKearney (2013). The need for buyers to develop an infrastructure for outsourcing inno-
vation suggests that there is a high fixed cost for this activity. 
158 See, e.g., Vossloh Fastening Systems, Supplier Questionnaire, Version 1.4 (May 2015), 
http://www.vossloh-fastening-
systems.com/media/downloads/pdfs/sonstiges/Lieferantenselbstauskunft_V14_20150513.pdf 
(requiring a three-year forecast for R & D expenditures); Siemens, Questionnaire: SQ Supplier 
Self-Description (v2.0-20110101), https://w5.siemens.com/cms/supply-chain-
management/en/supplier-at-siemens/download-center/Documents/SSD_en.pdf (“What’s your 
effort on R &D (in percent of Total Sales Revenue”). 
159 The International Standards Organization has a Working Group to design innovation man-
agement and measurement standards. See, e.g., ISO/TC 279 (“Innovation Management) (under 
development) and ISO/TS 181 Nanotechnologies (“aims to provide the necessary definitions that 
specify the bounds of key innovation indicators as they relate to nanotechnology”). 
	 55	
ture together.”160 And, as another put it, “if you develop the right relationship 
with your supply base, you can have . . . additional brains thinking about ways 
to improve your product.”161  
Although a supplier’s dedication to R & D and its creation of governance 
frameworks for innovation are important to buyers, a buyer’s choice of supplier 
in a context where supplier-led innovation or joint innovation is contemplated 
may also be strongly influenced by various aspects of the network around the 
supplier—such as whether the supplier sells the part (or even parts with related 
technologies) mostly to firms in the buyer’s industry or to buyers in multiple in-
dustries. Interestingly, OEMs typically explore these and other aspects of the 
supplier’s local network in some detail during the supplier qualification pro-
cess.162  																																																								
160 NOE Respondent. 
161 NOE Respondent. 
162 OEMs typically require suppliers to disclose information about their local network as part 
of the supplier qualification process. They are asked the identity of their most significant con-
tracting partners and any partners who might be considered competitors of the buyer, along with 
the amount of their output they sell to each, together with the percent of their output the pro-
posed deal would be.  
“Do you deliver to competitors of COMPANY . . . if so, please tell us. . . Please 
give the names of your most important COMPANYs [you deal with]. . .including 
percentage of your sales to them. . .[and] In your perception, what would be the 
mutual dependence that you perceive to be acceptable in a business relationship 
with COMPANY? (Expressed as percentage of sales, market position, relation to 
competitors, etc.” 
Supplier Questionnaire from Large International OEM (name withheld on request). 
Knowledge of network structure is valuable to buyers for a number of reasons. First, it helps 
them assess the supplier’s bankruptcy risk. If a supplier sells a large portion of its output to a 
buyer who is known to be opportunistic or who operates in an industry where there is highly 
variable and unpredictable downstream demand for its product, that buyer may well have the 
power to bankrupt or seriously jeopardize the supplier’s business. Second, this information 
sometimes helps a buyer assess the cost of monitoring quality or overseeing the supplier’s pro-
duction line. If, for example, the supplier is selling the good to a firm in a regulated industry 
where components must meet precise specifications (such as the production of an MRI machine) 
or to a buyer like John Deere who exercises detailed oversight of its suppliers’ production lines, 
the monitoring costs of buying from that supplier will be far lower than if the firm were not sell-
ing to these types of buyers. Third, network information may also impact the value of particular 
contract provisions. For example, some large OEMs who sole-source some parts are concerned 
about suppliers holding them up on price, so they include a most-favored-nation pricing provi-
sion in their contracts. This provision gives them the right to buy the goods at the lowest price the 
supplier charges to any other buyer. The suppliers’ local network can dramatically affect the val-
ue of this provision. If the supplier is selling the good to only four other firms who are all sole-
sourced to it, the clause is of little value. On the other hand, if the supplier is selling the good to 
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In contexts where the buyer’s goal is simply to keep up with the industry 
norm with respect to the quality and characteristics of the part, the buyer may 
prefer to purchase from a supplier who sells the part primarily to others in its in-
dustry.163 Such a supplier is in a good position to pool the non-intellectual prop-
erty-based tacit knowledge from other industry members and is likely to pro-
duce a product that conforms to the industry norm.164  
In contrast, a buyer who wants its suppliers to innovate on its behalf may pre-
fer to purchase from a supplier who sells to buyers in many industries.165 Such a 
supplier will have access to more distinct sets of both explicit and tacit 
knowledge; it is therefore more likely to innovate with respect to the part in 
question than a supplier without access to diverse sets of information.166 As a 
leading network sociologist explained, “[p]eople with . . . early access to diverse, 
often contradictory, information and interpretations . . . [have] a competitive ad-
vantage in seeing and developing good ideas,” and are at “higher risk [that is, 																																																																																																																																																																					
fifty buyers, a significant number of whom multi-source the part, the most favored nations clause 
makes it far less likely that the supplier will be able to hold the buyer up on price. Fourth, buyers 
worried about technology leakage might be far more comfortable dealing with suppliers whose 
local networks involve buyers in other industries. Finally, as discussed further below, the struc-
ture of a supplier’s local network may be of interest to the buyer because it may influence the 
likelihood that that the supplier will be able to innovate on behalf of the buyer in the future, see 
infra Part V. The economic value of this information is indicated by the fact that commercial com-
panies have begun to sell it. The Bloomberg Business database now has information on all public 
companies and their public suppliers as well as partial information on privately held companies. 
Another start up, Spiderbook.com, which is currently in beta testing, also trolls the web for public 
information from both the SEC and the trade press and compiles information about buyer and 
supplier webs of commercial relationships. Similar information is also provided by SCImar-
ket.com, though it currently contains information only about publicly traded companies. 
163 In such a situation a buyer is unlikely to be faced with the so-called “innovator’s dilemma,” 
which arises when a buyer wants to get the benefit of the tacit knowledge a supplier obtains from 
other buyers but does not want the supplier to share the tacit knowledge learned from him with 
his other buyers (Christensen 2011). 
164 Such a supplier may have an advantage in that if the industry norm is rather static, it will 
be in a better position to move down the learning curve of production.  
165 Similarly, some suppliers seek a diversified buyer base so that they can learn from their 
customers. When a Supplier in the NOE study was asked if it was an advantage to work in “mul-
tiple end user industries,” the supplier explained that in deciding who to sell to the answer to the 
question “are we learning from them?” was a key criterion. See also Alcacer & Oxley (2012). An-
other advantage of this structure is that if a supplier “leaks” tacit or even explicit information to 
its other customers, it will not be to the buyer’s competitors. As a consequence, buyers are more 
likely to share information of all types with these industry-diversified suppliers, again increasing 
the likelihood that they will innovate. 
166 See Burt (2005, 74–76), and sources cited therein. 
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likelihood] of having good ideas . . . [because] ways of thinking and behaving are 
more homogeneous within than between groups, so people connected to other-
wise segregated groups are more likely to be familiar with alternative ways of 
thinking and behaving, which gives them the option of selecting and synthesiz-
ing alternatives.”167 Indeed, the social capital literature is replete with examples 
demonstrating that individuals with access to more diverse sources of infor-
mation are more likely to come up with new and innovative ideas than individu-
als who have access only or primarily to ideas from a relatively closed group that 
interacts primarily with its own members—like a division of a large bureaucratic 
firm producing a good solely for intra-firm consumption.  
  Interestingly, the move by firms to outsource or co-develop R&D/innovation 
occurred in tandem with the development of the contract governance approaches 
described here. These approaches, which depend for their effectiveness on the 
existence of relationship-specific social capital and the availability of network 
governance, enable buyer firms to enjoy many of the benefits of intra-firm pro-
duction—such as low-powered incentives and the coordination benefits associat-
ed with hierarchy—while engaging in market transactions. This suggests that in 
thinking about the determination of firm boundaries in the modern economy, the 
decision to “buy” is much more involved than simply using an arms' length 
market-mediated contract and the decision to “make” is not the only way to se-
cure the benefits of low-powered incentives and hierarchically managed pro-
jects.168 It also reveals that the network structure of the relevant industry, which 
																																																								
167 Interview with CEO of a Cable-Industry-Related Start-up (Nov. 9, 2015). The CEO ex-
plained that he hired about 80% from outside of the cable industry, so that his employees would 
bring new ideas to the table. For a discussion of the ways that good and innovative ideas origi-
nate and empirical evidence that information within groups tends to be more homogeneous than 
information across groups and that firms with more open networks are likely to be more innova-
tive, see Burt (2005, 63, 69, 90 & Ch. 3) (reporting the results of a study of purchasing managers 
which found that “better ideas [for improving the company] came from the purchasing managers, 
whose work brought them into contact with other companies,” and more parts of their own com-
panies); see also Hargadon (2003) (exploring the role of networks that bridge different markets or 
information sets in facilitating technological innovation). 
168 The Tadelis and Williamson articulation of the Williamson theory of the firm assumes that 
in most instances innovation (bilateral adaption) can best be accomplished within the firm due to 
the combination of low-powered incentives and administrative fiat made available by intra-firm 
hierarchy, see Tadelis & Williamson (2012). However, sociological studies of the forces that drive 
successful innovation suggest that “when knowledge is broadly distributed and brings a compet-
itive advantage, the locus of innovation is found in a network of interorganizational relation-
ships,” rather than within any single organizational entity, and the benefit any given firm reaps 
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in turn strongly influences the types of inter-firm commitments that can be ade-
quately bonded, may also play a key role in a firm’s make-or-buy decision in a 
particular context.169 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, understanding the formal mechanisms and social-capital related forc-
es that make these relational contracts work suggests that relational governance 
is more expensive to implement than is generally recognized.170 Yet it also re-
veals that relational governance can create benefits for the contracting parties 
that go far beyond the particular transactions in which it is used.171 As compared 																																																																																																																																																																					
from innovation is closely tied to its position in the relevant network of firms. See Powell & Ko-
put (1996). 
169 Although there are no studies testing this link, in large part because metrics rating a firm’s 
innovativeness have not traditionally been available, these metrics are in the final stage of devel-
opment by both private consulting firms and the International Standards Organization, see supra 
note 159. 
170 Even in the New York diamond industry—where the social capital underlying contractual 
relationships has an organic basis in the religious and community ties among its members—the 
Diamond Dealers Club, the bourse where most transactions are concluded, has adopted written 
rules and created costly contract adjudication and enforcement institutions to support these 
agreements. See Bernstein (1992). Similarly, in the cash cotton industry which was deeply em-
bedded in the culture of the Old South, the industry created a variety of rules, information chan-
nels, and dispute resolution tribunals to support trade and make nonlegal sanctions an important 
and effective contract governance mechanism. See Bernstein (2001). 
171 The arguments advanced in the text have implications for the management literature’s per-
spective on when relational contracts should be used and how they create value in certain trans-
actional contexts. Management scholars suggest that self-enforcing relational contracts create four 
types of benefits. First, they decrease contracting costs because of a reduced need for specification 
(and with it more effective deterrence, since all possible sources of opportunism can rarely be 
specified in a contract). Second, they decrease monitoring costs “because self-enforcement relies 
on self-monitoring rather than external or third party monitoring.” Third, they reduce “the costs 
associated with complex adaptation, thereby allowing exchange partners to adjust the agreement 
‘on the fly’ to respond to unforeseen market changes.” And, finally, “self enforcing agreements 
are superior to contracts at minimizing transaction costs over the long run because they are not 
subject to the time limitations of contracts,” which are assumed to be valid over only a specified 
period of time. Dyer & Singh (1998). However, as the description and analysis presented here 
suggests that, during the early stages of contracting relationships, trust is most likely to evolve 
when obligations are well specified and the tools used to determine whether goods are up to 
specifications are accurate and their output transparent. These measurement mechanisms are 
costly to create and administer. However, these costs are often overlooked because these theorists 
tend to focus on the benefits of relational governance, once the cost of developing the relation-
ship-specific capital that supports it has already been borne. Furthermore, the monitoring costs 
involved in self-enforcing agreements are unlikely to be lower than in contracts designed to be 
enforced in court, because in both contexts it is a contracting party, not a third party, who must 
detect any breach. As for the purported “adjustments on the fly,” these are routinely made 
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to more arm’s-length types of governance, it increases the likelihood that the 
buyer and the supplier will exchange the type of information that may enable 
their employees to identify additional value-creating opportunities. It may also 
facilitate joint or supplier-led innovation. Moreover, by promoting the growth of 
relationship-specific social capital, which in turn creates trust, relational govern-
ance has the potential to broaden the range of the non-contractable commitments 
the parties can credibly make, particularly in contexts where network govern-
ance is a relevant force.  
More broadly, looking at the ways that procurement contracts are structured 
suggests that the goals of industrial contracting are far broader than the goals 
typically associated with routine transactions for the sale of goods. When OEMs 
enter into agreements with their suppliers, their goal is not only to obtain con-
tractual performance, but also to create a framework for an ongoing contracting 
relationship, a framework that is structured to build the types of relational and 
structural social capital that will enable the parties to identify and take advantage 
of future value-creating opportunities. As a consequence, lawyers drafting con-
tracts cannot hope to create value-creating contractual frameworks, nor can they 
avoid steps that will decrease the value of these frameworks unless they under-
stand how to harness social capital and understand their client’s goals, not only 
for the contract they are drafting, but also for the buyer’s and supplier’s future 
contracting relationship. 
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